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PREFACE

What are the problems and goals of the people of the United States in
relation to their public lands, especially thos e lands suited for intensive
agriculture?

What are some alternatives to the policies and laws presently

governing the disposal or use of such lands for agricultural purposes?
These and related questions are discussed in the papers in this volume to
help the Public Land Law Review Commission carry out its responsibility for
recommending ways that the public lands can provide maximum benefit to the
general public.
The general public is obviously composed of many publics, and each has
its own problems , interests, and goals which sometimes conflict.

In the
first paper, "Farm Tenure Problems and Goals of Farmers and Farm Landlords,"

the various publics are separated into two groups:

(1)

prospective farmers

who wish to become tenants or owners of public lands suited for crop pro
duction, and

( 2)

all the publics, including the prospective farmers, who

are represented by the government acting as landlord or real estate devel
oper.
Some insights into the problems and interes ts of prospective farmers
are provided by an exploration of the tenure difficulties and goals of
actual farmers as revealed by the literature.
The evidence suggests that
the most important farm tenure problems are related to the lack of the
four F's:
(1) fixity or security of tenure or occupancy, (2) freedom of
improvement or long-run management,
management, and

(4)

(3)

freedom of operation or short-run

fair rents or fair land prices and payment plans.

Attention is also given to the views of farm landlords since their
views may indicate in some small way those of the general public as rep
resented by the various federal land management agencies.
Security of tenure, freedom to improve and to operate, and fair rents
and payments are also important factors in the experiences of other nations
which have public lands suitable for agriculture.

Various alternatives

used by several countries for the management or disposal of public lands
are identified and analyzed in the second paper, "Public Land Disposal by
Leasehold and Freehold in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Nether
lands."
A supplementary article on Australian land policy by

K. O.

Campbell

of the University of Sydney is reproduced in the Appendix.

Russell L. Berry
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FARM T ENURE PROBLEMS

AND

GOALS OF

FARMERS AND

FARM LANDLORDS

Russell L. Berry
I.

The Elusive Nature of Farm Tenure Problems

The task of determining the crucial farm tenure problems is as diffi
cult as it is important. As Dewey said, "There is not at first a situ
ption and a problem, much less just a problem and no situation. There is
a troubled, perplexed, trying situation, where the difficulty is, as it
were, spread throughout the entire situation, infecting it as a whole. If
we knew just what the difficulty was and where it lay, the job of reflec
tion would be much easier than it is. As the saying truly goes, a question
well put is half answered. In fact, we know what the problem exactly is
simultaneously with finding a way out and getting it resolved. Problem and
solution stand out completely at the same time. Up to that point our
grasp of the problem has been more or less vague and tentative.111
That land-tenure research workers' grasp of tenure problems has also
been vague and tentative has been made clear by Salter, who reviewed
published research in this field between 1910 and 1945. He concluded:
In the first place a good deal of the work is not of the
problem-solving type. Much effort has been given to describing
existing lease forms and republicizing census data, not with any
purpose of revealing sources of difficulty or finding solutions,
but merely to make simple information available to any who might
be interested in it. Only in [H. cJ Taylor's earliest work and
a few rare instances since, is there any evidence that investiga
tions were specifically conducted for the purpose of clarifying
difficulties and uncovering experiments in which these diffi
culties had been overcome.

1

John Dewey, How We Think (Boston: D. C. Heath and Co., 1933), as
presented by Randall, Buchler, and Shirk in Readings in Philosophy (New
York: Barnes and Noble Inc., 1946), p. 187 (italics in original).
Russell L. Berry is Associate Professor of Economics at South Dakota
State University, Brookings, South Dakota. This paper is a revision of
his The Scully Estate and its Cash-Leasing System in the Midwest, Ph.D.
thesis. Ohio State University, 1966.
·

On the contrary
there has been an increasing pre
dominance of reports with no action problem posed, no problem
explored and no problem solved.2
•

•

•

Salter goes on to say "it should be recognized that research has
its roots in problematic situations; that is, it exists because of
conditions under which there is doubt as to what people should do be
cause there is conflict between the purposes they are striving to
achieve and the consequences they are experiencing. There is need for
sharper attention to the preliminary exploration and clear definition
of problems--that is, to the statement of doubts and conflicts
The
next step is to encourage the functional use of hypotheses. Hypotheses
are suggested alternative lines of action that will lead to the
achievement of purposes. Their function is to direct the search for
evidence
" (p. 252)
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Despite the favorable reaction to Salter's criticism and despite
the enthusiasm of tenure-research workers for John Dewey's ideas about
the necessity of exploring troubled, perplexing and difficult situations
to discover the problem, there remains much doubt and uncertainty about
the nature of land-tenure problems. For example, in 1955 the Inter
regional Land Tenure Research Committee, in its "Gray Report," suggests
that inefficiency, instability and inequality in resource use are the
relevant social problems; and the objective or the goal is to remove
them. If this is true, "then the functions of tenure arrangements
become the creation of necessary incentives and means conducive to (1)
efficient resource use, (2) stability of resource productivity, and
(3) equality of access of resources among individuals.113
These goals were sharply criticized by Bogholt who asked, ''What is
the basis
for the claim that the situation described as desirable as
an end is really so?
How was it come by? By what special methods?
What assurance is given, open to the test of others, that the ends set up
are desirable, as is asserted?" He goes on to say, "the genuine judgment
as to what is desirable is the outcome of an inquiry which is instigated by
an experienced lack or insufficiency in a unique situation. The lack or
insufficiency, let us call it a gap or discrepancy, is not something that
•

•

•

•

•

•

2
Leonard A. Salter, Jr., A Critical Review of Research in Land Eco
nomics, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Pr�s, 1948), P:- 230. See
also Joseph Ackerman, "Status and Appraisal of Research in Farm Tenancy,"
Journal of Farm Economics 23 (1941), pp. 229-30.
3r
nterregional Land Tenure Research Committee, Agricultural �
Tenure Research, Scope and Nature: Reappraisal, 122.2., The Gray Report,
Farm Foundation ( Chicago, 1955), p. 2.
2

is determined by comparing the existent with an ideal.
directly experienced.114

It is a situation

The Gray Report was revised in 1962 by Ottoson, Wunderlich and Dies
slin who found that efficiency, stability and equality as tenure goals
left much to be desired. "In the first place there can be goals other than
efficiency, stability and equality of access; such things as economic prog
ress, distribution of income, political freedom, freedom from economic
restraint, balanced growth
security and justice come to mind
In
the second place, and perhaps even more important from the standpoint of
research, the three objectives suggested in the Gray Report are so general,
so obscure, that they are of little use empirically.115
•

•

•

•

•

•

Although 26 areas of suggested tenure research were then outlined,
the authors "make no pretense this 'listing' approach is the well
calculated result of a logically constructed system of objectives" (p. 4 ).
Because of the confusion in identifying the major tenure problems,
objectives or goals, it is fitting that the first objective of a farm
tenure research project should be to determine the problems or to "identify
the objectives and purposes that people expect tenure arrangements to serve"
before it attempts to "appraise alternative tenure systems and institutions
which impede or expedite achievement of objectives" or "examine in detail
specific arrangements with consideration given to how well they serve the
aspirations of people involved and the impact on resource use and connnunity
life.116
II.

The Four F's and Cash Leasing in England

What was the crucial problem in the tenure situation of English ten
ants?
Ashby notes that during the nineteenth century, English landlord
tenant problems centered around what were then known as "the three F's:
Fair rents, fixity of tenure and freedom of cropping, to which was added

4 Carl M. Bogholt, "Value Judgment and Land Tenure Research," Land
Tenure Research Workshop, Farm Foundation (Chicago, 1956), pp. 133�
5Howard W. Ottoson, Gene Wunderlich, and Howard G. Diesslin, Land
Tenure Research, Scope and Nature, U.S. Department of Agriculture, ERS119 (1962), pp. 2-3.
-

6

These are the three objectives of South Dakota Agricultural Experi
ment Station Research Project 371, approved 18 June 196 2, a contributing
project to NC-53 which has similar objectives.

3

later freedom of sale of produce.
Demand on the part of tenants for
fixity of tenure
or alternately provision for compensation for
improvements made by the tenant became necessary as agricultural prac
tices developed and traditional systems no longer sufficed.117
•

•

•

•

•

It would be a mistake, however, to believe that these problems were
unique to the nineteenth century. Two centuries earlier Walter Blith,
English Improver Improved (1652) declared, "If a Tenant be at ever so
great paines or cost for the improvement of his Land, he doth thereby but
occaision a greater Rack upon himself, or else invests his Land-Lord into
his cost and labour gratis, or at best lies at his Land-Lord's mercy for
requitall; which occaisions a neglect of all good Husbandry
Now this
I humble conceive may be removed, if there were a Law Inacted by which
every Land-Lord should be obliged, either to give him reasonable allowance
for his clear Improvement, or else suffer him or his to enjoy it so much
longer as till he hath a proportionable requitall.118
•

•

•

Alternatively these early English landlords and tenants were being
urged to make 21-year leases, such as were being used in Flanders, which
specified that "whatsoever four indifferent persons (whereof two to bee
chosen by one and two of the other) should judg the Farm to bee improved
at the end of his Leas, the Owner was to paie so much in value to the
Tenant for his improving it.119
Long-term leases eventually became common in certain parts of England,
but rapid changes in prices caused them to fall into disfavor with both
landlord and tenant. The question of compensation for unexhausted value
still arose at the end of the term, and the tenant who for years had been
secure became progressively less secure as the term approached its end.
Some tenants who did not expect the lease to be renewed used the last
years to "milk" the land. Another reason for the decline in the use of
long-term leases may have been the decline in the need for major farm
improvements such as clearing and draining or the assumption of this

7A.

W. Ashby, "Farm Tenancy," Encyclopaedia Social Science, vol. 6

(1931), p. 121. A fourth F, freedom to improve, was probably already

achieved by the time the three F's became a popular expression of tenure
goals. In any event, freedom to improve was the first of the major tenure
goals achieved.
8 Lord Ernle, English Farming Past and Present, rev. (London:
Cass and Co. Ltd., 1961) , p. 113.

Frank

9
sir Richard Weston, Discours of the Husbandrie used in Brabrant
and Flanders (1645; pub. by Samuel Hartlib in 1650 and 1651), as quoted

by Ernle, English Farming, p. 113.
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responsibility by the landlord.

With no major improvements to be made,

about all the landlord wanted of the tenant was the rent and maintenance
of the property--requirements as easily met under a short-term lease as
a long one.
So long as these conditions were met, the tenant may have
enjoyed a strong feeling of security.
Ashby noted that "tenancies from year to year,

in practice for one

year and then from one year to another until notice to terminate is given
by one of the parties, are theoretially short term leases.

But in prac

tice agreements for tenancies from year to year may subsist for long
periods.

There are well authenticated cases of continuous occupation of

one farm by one family for two or three generations under such agreements
in England.

•

•

On the whole it is probable that tenancies subsist for

longer periods under the year to year agreements than under leases for
periods of years" ( p. 120)

•

It would be a mistake,

however, to assume that long occupancy always

results in a feeling of secure tenure.
the landlord and customary practice.

Much depends upon the nature of
When the landlord is a permanent

estate consisting of many farms and has an established record of fair
dealing with tenants,

never putting them off except for failure to pay

the rent or flagrant abuse of the property,

the tenants are as likely to

feel secure as if they had a long-term lease.
only one or two farms,

But when the landlord owns

has little ability to deal with tenants,

lacks

financial security,

is quite old and has heirs who cannot be expected to

continue the lease,

the short-term tenant will probably feel insecure.

Under these circumstances even a long-term lease might not be of much
help because the tenant may feel that the landlord will find a reason to
break the lease if it is to his advantage to do so.
out "all landlords were not good landlords,

As Thomas pointed

and a traditional system un

trammeled with legal restrictions gave scope for the bad landlord as well
as opportunity for the good landlord.

In particular, the system suffered
from three drawbacks known to students of the subject as the 'three F's'
standing for the absence of fair rents, fixity of tenure and free sale. 1110
To make the general practice uniform,

legislation was first adopted

in 1851 which gave the tenant the right to remove certain improvements,
provided he had received the written consent of the landlord before build
ing them.
In 1875 an Agricultural Holdings Act was adopted which permit
ted the outgoing tenant to claim compensation for the unexhausted value
of certain improvements that he had made, but the law could be,

and often

was, circumvented.
In 1883 the provisions of the law were made compulsory
so that all tenants when quitting a farm could claim compensation for the

lO

Edgar Thomas, "Tenure of Agricultural Land in Britain," Family
Farm Polic
y, ed. Ackerman and Harris (Chicago:
University of Chicago
Press, 1947) , p. 165.

5

value of unexhausted improvements to an oncoming tenant.11
Two goals, "fixity of tenure" and "freedom of c:ropping," were
achieved in 1906 when Parliament passed an act which permitted the ten
ant to claim compensation for unjustified di3turbance and gave him, sub
ject to some restrictions, freedom to follow a eystem of farming of his
own choosing.
In 1920 the third goal, "fair rents," was largely achieved by an
other act permitting the tenant to demand arbit:ration of the rent to be
paid. If the landlord :refused to arbitrate, the tenant could leave the
farm and claim compensation for unjustified distu:rbance just as if the
landlord had given notice. This law also permitted the tenant to claim
compensation for farming practices superior to those of the community.
Parliament consolidated all these laws into the Agricultural Holdings
Act of 1923. Further changes were made in the Agricultural Act of 1947
and the tenure provisions were again consolidated in the Agricultural
Holdings Act 1948, making "the once servile tenant into the spoilt darling
of the legislature
by putting land tenure on a basis which, in prac
tice, made a solvent sitting tenant irremovable and kept rents substan
tially below their open market level. Subsequent political trends made
adjustments in favor of the agricultural landlord inevitable 1 and the
first installment was made in the Agricultural Act of 1958 . n u_
•

•

•

Watson had earlier called attention to the fact "that the law has
been repeatedly changed to the advantage of the tenant. It is no matter
for surprise that the tenants now no longer ask for long leases; the
common tenancy--which runs from year to year until one party or the other
gives a year's notice to terminate--gives all the security that could be
reasonably demanded. Again it is not surprising that British farmers
(who, in general, have never had much ambition to own their fal'lllS) are
now definitely adverse to ownership. A farmer will rarely buy if he can
rent the kind of a farm he wants. The main anxiety now is whether the
landlord will be able or willing, for the future to fulfill what a:re re
garded as his normal responsibilities--the maintenance and modernization

1�his and the following discussion of English laws is based on

"Improvement of the Tenant Status in England," Farm Tenancy Report of
the President's Committee (Washington, D. C. : U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1937), pp. 72-73.

120. R. McGregor, "Agriculture in an Industrial Society," in Ernle,
English Farming, Past� Present, 1961 ( Chap. I.V of Introduction),
p. cxliii.

6

when necessary of the farmhouse, hired men's house, barns, farm roadways
and drainage systems.1113
Thus the law which Walter Blith called for in 1652 was finally
enacted in 1883, and in subsequent legislation the other F's have been
fully achieved. Indeed they appear to have been over achieved so that
the landlords, rather than the tenants, now have a serious tenure prob
lem. Be that as it may, the passage of the tenancy legislation indicates
that the four F's were major objectives or goals of farmers.
III.

The Four F's and Owner-Operation in the United States

During the two centuries that the English tenant was acquiring the
four F's, his cousin in America was achieving the four F's and more by
fee simple ownership. The attempts to reproduce medieval feudalism in
the New World by making large grants to royalty failed simply because
land was too easily obtained in other ways. Therefore, men who ventured
to the Colonies did not voluntarily settle on the feudal holdings that
were set up. Attempts to collect quitrents also failed. Why would any
one agree to pay such rents when land was almost free for the taking?
Why would anyone become a tenant on unimproved land, then after clearing
the wilderness lose or share the returns with a landlord who had contri
buted little or nothing?
Lands granted to the New England Colonies were in turn granted to
groups of settlers who created townships and divided the land by lot
according to need and productivity. This system was based on the English
manorial system, but the manorial head was replaced by a democratic town
government. Instead of rents, taxes were paid; no doubt the question of
"fair taxes" replaced the question of "fair rents. " Because the settler
had fixity of tenure, freedom of improvement, and freedom of cropping,
the Old World problems did not arise. 14
The only fully developed manorial system arose in the middle colonies
that later became New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, and Dela
ware. This system was started by the Dutch in New York--especially along
lJJames A. S. Watson, "Land Ownership, Farm Tenancy and Farm Labor
in Britain," Agricultural History 17 (1943), p. 77.
14E. E. Edwards, "American Agriculture--the First JOO Years" in
Farmers in� Changin World, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Yearbook
of Agriculture (1940 , pp. 175-76; Murray R. Benedict, Farm Policies of
the United States, 1785-1900 (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 195JJ:'
p. 6.

�

7

the Hudson River--but these manors were al.most deserted when the British
took over in 1664. The lands that are now New York, Pennsylvania and
Delaware were granted to the Duke of York, a younger brother of the King.
In 1680 the Duke leased Pennsylvania and Delaware to William Penn for
10 , 000 years.
The Duke's effort to introduce the quitrents (cash payments as a
substitute for labor on the Lord's holdings) was unpopular and poorly
enforced. Nonetheless, quitrents continued to be a source of irritation,
even violence, until the middle of the nineteenth century. Penn's efforts
to establish manorial systems were somewhat more successful partially be
cause the quitrents were only a penny an acre. The New England system
and the headright system were also used and, of course, with virtually
unlimited land available, these systems provided unbeatable competition
for the manors.
In Virginia a headright of 50 acres could be secured by anyone who
"adventured" himself to the Colony. Soon this privilege was extended to
every member of the family and finally to anyone who would pay one to five
shillings for the right. The headright could be located on any available
land, and of course, the best was chosen. At the beginning of the eight
eenth century other methods of land disposal were used by the southern
Colonies. Small grants with quitrents were used. Some groups of settlers
established semi-autonomous communities known as "hundreds."
The scarcity of labor also made it difficult for large landed estates
to develop. At least four of five free white men in the Colonies were
farmers on their own land. They were not interested in developing land
for others. Only the introduction of Negro slaves made the large estates
and plantations profitable and possible. These plantations resembled
manors except that they were worked by slaves. Once created, they tended
to be kept intact in Virginia by primogeniture and entails until 1776
when Jefferson succeeded in changing these laws. 15
The abolition of primogeniture and entails, started by Jefferson in
Virginia, soon spread to the other states. Both primogeniture and entails
were prohibited by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 which specified that
property of all ttdying intestate, shal;l. descend to, and be distributed
among th�ir children, and the descendants of a deceased child, in equal
parts. nlb
l5E. E. Edwards, Jefferson and Agriculture, U. S. Department of
Agriculture Agricultural History Series no. 7 (1943), p. 54.
16
H. S. Commager, Documents of American History, 5th ed. (New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. , 19�), p. 128.
8

Although the outlawing of primogeniture and entails did not prevent
estates being held together by will and trusts, the action clearly in
dicates that the farmers of the time chose to solve the problems of the
four F's not by long leases, compensatory clauses and legislation, but
by ownership. Although the problems and goals were much the same, the
English tenant took the road to tenancy improvement and his American
cousin the road to ownership.
If the manorial system had succeeded, the problems of the four F's
probably would have been as severe in this country as in England. But
the scarcity of labor and the abundance of land made the purchase of
land for resale to farmers in fee simple a more attractive business than
leasing. For the American farmer the major concern was with "fair sale"
of land, fair credit terms, and eventually free land which gave him the
remaining three F's--fixity of tenure, freedom of improvement and free
dom of operation.

Starting in 1787, one land credit scheme after another was tried
and found wanting. By 1820 credit was abolished in favor of cash sales
with a minimum price of $1.25 per acre. In 1841 the Preemption Act
was passed which allowed those who settled on the public domain ahead
of the surveys to have first opportunity to acquire title to 160 acres
when it was offered for sale at the minimum price. In 1854 the Gradua
tion Act provided that land which had been on the market 10 years could
be sold for $1.00 an acre, 15 years for $.75, 20 years at $.50 and so
on. Then in 1862, after a long struggle for "free land," the Homestead
Act of that year virtually gave 160 acres of land to any settler after
five years of residence or permitted him to commute this requirement
by paying $1.25 to $2.50 per acre. The original Homestead Act was fol
lowed by the Desert Land Act, the Timber Culture Act, and the Timber and
Stone Act. All these acts made it possible for the settler to secure
the additional land needed for an economic unit in the West.
Unfortunately the settlers had to learn the hard way that free land
was not inexhaustible and that what was free to one generation was cost
ly for the next. As a result, farm tenancy increased from 25 percent
in 1880, to 35 percent in 1900, and to 37 percent by 1910. Sharp in
creases in land prices doubled the need for credit for land purchases,
and agitation for more credit resulted in a return to governmental
credit for farm ownership. Strong pressures resulted in the passage
of the Federal Farm Loan Act in 1916, which established the Federal
Land Banks. One of the strongest arguments for this Act was that it
would give deserving tenants an opportunity to become owners; but from
1917 to 1921 only 18 percent of the loans were used to purchase land,
and the figure did not rise above 20 percent until 1937.17

l7
William G. Murray, "Governmental Farm Credit and Tenancy," Agri
cultural Finance, 2nd ed. (Ames: Iowa State College Press, 1947), pp.
341-2.
9

That farmers and their leaders were greatly concerned about the prob
lem of maintaining the four F's

by

owner-operation is indicated

number of States that enacted credit measures between

1913

and

by

the

1915.

These were Massachusetts, Utah, Wisconsin, New York, Missouri, Oklahoma,
Montana, Minnesota, and the.two Dakotas.
The depression of the 1930s and the extensive farm-mortgage fore
closures caused the federal government to pass the Emergency Farm Mort
gage Act of

1933

ting loans after
of the farm.
In

which provided for Land Bank Commissioner Loans permit

1945
1937

up to 65 percent of the normal agricultural value
Congress passed the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act

which, according to Murray, "was a clear-cut mandate of Congress to use

319).

Government credit to aid tenants in purchasing farms" (p.
feature was that these loans could be made for up to
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of the farm as certified by a county committee of farmers. Lack of funds
and the limitation of loans to farms of average size or smaller has kept

the program from significantly affecting the farm-tenure situation, but
its existence does emphasize the strong demand for the achievement of the

by

four F's

IV.

owner-operation.

Landlord and Tenant Opinion Regarding the Four F's

The evidence available from farm tenure survey$ leaves much to be
desired.

None of the studies reviewed below had as its sole objective

the determination of what problems frustrate farmers.

Indeed, in most,

evidence of the nature of the problem is a side product of other purposes.
Questions designed to determine a farmer's frustrations and the cause
of those frustrations are difficult to construct.

Even when· good ques

tions have been designed, the farmer's answers will vary with his experi
ence and intelligence. This is true because it is one thing to experience
difficulty and be frustrated and quite another to be able to identify and
express the cause of the difficulty.

The survey results, however, do

give some evidence of the nature of farm-tenure problems.
That tenants want more fixity of tenure is suggested

by

their desire

for longer-term leases even though the strength of this desire has not
been satisfactorily measured.
that of
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Similar results were secured when 90 central South Dakota tenants
were asked (1) "What is the length of your present lease?" and (2) "What
length of lease do you prefer?" Although 95 percent had one-year or year
to-year leases, 66 percent preferred three-year terms or longer, and 35
percent five-year terms or longer.19 These answers were in sharp contrast
to replies from 267 South Dakota landlords. Of these, 83 percent used a
one-year lease and 78 percent said they preferred the short term (p. 6).
In 1961, questionnaires were sent to 250 landlords and 500 tenants in
Brookings County, South Dakota. Replies were received from 85 landlords
and 130 tenants. Only 53 percent of these landlords said that they be
lieved long-term leases should be made, whereas 84 percent of the tenants
preferred long terms. It is also possible that some of the landlords who
said they favored long terms may have confused long terms with long occu
pancy, which they favor--provided a good job of farming is done and a fair
rent is paid. In any event, the difference in opinion is still consider
able. 20
Tenants seem to feel fairly confident of long occupancy--perhaps
believing that they can keep the landlord satisfied that they are doing
a good job and paying a fair rent. For example, 60 percent of the ten
ants in Moody County, South Dakota, said they felt they had 10 chances
out of 10 of keeping their present farms for the next 5 years, even though
many of these tenants had one-year leases and preferred longer terms.
Only 26 percent said they had a 50-50 chance or less of keeping the farm
for the next five years. Moreover, only 17 percent thought that a five
year lease would increase their chances of keeping the farm for the next
five years. The rest (83 percent) thought it would not make much differ
ence.21
Why then do tenants prefer longer-term leases? A possible answer
is that they want more freedom of operation or management than they have
under short terms. If this is true, why do farm landlords resist the
tenants' desire for more freedom and independence? Asked why the short
term lease was customarily used, 65 percent of 267 South Dakota landlords

l9
R. L. Berry, Share Rents and Short-Term Farm Leases, South Dakota
Agricultural Experiment Station Circular 1171'1955), p. 5, Tables 1 and 3.
20
R. L. Berry, Farm Tenancy Problems in South Dakota, South Dakota
Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 510 (1963), Table 21, fourth
question.
21
R. L. Berry and V. E. Bau, Tenant Interest in Long Term Cash and
Flexible Cash Leases, South Dakota Agricultural Experiment Station
Bulletin 480 (1959), p. 16, Tables 9 and 10.
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replying chose the statement, "Because the short-term lease keeps the
tenant on his toes since he knows you can get another tenant if he does
a poor job.1 122 In the 1961 study, 67 percent of the landlords and 77
percent of the tenants indicated that they believed the following state
"The main reason why the short-term lease is customarily
ment was true:
used is to make sure that the tenant does a good job of farming and pays
a fair share as rent. 1123
Because the share-rent lease was being used by almost all of these
landlords, it is not difficult to understand the reluctance to grant long
term leases that would permit tenants to farm in a way that might serious
ly reduce rents. After all, the short term is the landlord's best insur
ance against a tenant who does a poor job and pays a poor rent.

v.

Land-Tenure Research Workers and the Four F's

Although research bulletins on farm tenancy between 1910 and 1945
had little to say about tenure problems and goals, some special reports
and journal articles were beginning to discuss them.
In 1937 the President's Committee recognized ownership as the his
toric means of achieving security rather than being an end or goal in
itself. Therefore, it urged not only more credit for ownership but also
legislation similar to that in England to give the tenant more security
of tenure and more freedom of improvement. Security of tenure and free
dom of improvement thus appear to be the immediate goals sought.
Stabil
ity of rural life, soil conservation, conservation of levels of living,
It is
and economic stability and security, however, were also discussed.
not clear whether these latter were regarded as tenure goals or as general
goals of society that were only incidentally related to tenure.24
22
Berry, Share Rents, pp. 10-13, Table 7. The other alternatives
listed were:
(A) Because long-term leases are not as binding on tenants
as they are on landlords, (B) Because the one-year lease gives the land
lord a chance to increase the rent as his expenses rise, (C) quoted
above, (D) Other. An open-end pretest indicated that these answers were
the most popular.
23
Berry, Farm Tenancy Problems, Table 21, last question.

D. C.:

24

Report of the President's Committee, Farm Tenancy (Washington,
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1937;:-pp. 9-18.
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Henry C. Taylor, a member of the President's Committee, pointed out
that fair rent, security of tenure, and freedom of operation were goals
of the past and raised the question as to what degree these should be
sacrificed to achieve other goals of society. 25
Maddox listed four outstanding goals of the major national programs.
One of these was "security, opportunity and personal integrity of nonland
owning agriculturalists, such as tenants and farm laborers. " Another was
to maintain owner-operation. Whether the security ref erred to is economic
or tenure-related was not made clear. 26 Much clearer was Schickele's
statement that "security of tenure and opportunity to exercise initiative
and develop managerial competence on the part of the tenant are corner
stones of an efficient tenancy system which are deplorably lacking in the
corn belt. " To achieve these objectives, compensation for the tenant's
unexhausted improvements and automatic continuation clauses with longer
term notices were recommended for study. 27
In contrast, Wiley believed that the tenure problem was one of in
creasing the farmer's equity whether he be a tenant or an owner. Larger
farms and greater efficiency thus were regarded as means to greater equity.
Nonetheless he called for improvements in landlord-tenant relationships,
"thereby leading to greater security of tenure. 1128
Brandt said our society calls for a tenure system that will foster
economic efficiency in such a way that an optimum of creativity, and
individual freedom and security can be attained. "Greater security of
tenure and compensation for improvements promises to assimilate the func
tioning of tenancy to that of owner operation and to lead to longer occu
pancy, more conservationist husbandry and improvement in durable land
improvements. The social and professional standards of tenants will grad
1129
ually be raised
•

•

•

•

25H. C. Taylor, "Land Tenure and Social Control of the Use of Land"
in Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference of Agricultural Econ
omists (1938 pp. 140-165.
26
J. G. Maddox, "Land Tenure Research in a National Land Policy, "
Journal of Farm Economics 19, no. 1 (1937), p. 106.
27Rainer Schickele, "Tenure Problems and Research Needs in the Middle
West, " Journal of Farm Economics 19, no. 1 (1937), pp. 118-22.
28 c. A. Wiley, "Tenure Problems and Research Needs in the South, "
Journal of Farm Economics 19, no. 1 (1937), pp. 133, 138.
29Karl Brandt, "Toward a More Adequate Approach to the Farm Tenure
Program, " Journal of Farm Economics 24, no. 1 (1942), pp. 208, 225.
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To Hoffsommer, control in tenure relations is more fundamental than
security of tenure. "Control implies the ability to do what one wants to
do--to be either venturesome or conservative," he declared.JO Thus control
implies freedom of short-run operation and long-run improvement. Without
security of tenure, such control or freedom is not likely to exist.
Although Hammar disagreed with Brandt about the importance of the
tenure problem, he did little to clarify the point. He decried the land
tenure ideal or goal of owner-operation and argued that if efficiency in
the use of human resources were achieved, the tenure problem would largely
solve itself. 31
In 1943 Timmons stressed the importance of distinguishing between
ends and means in farm-tenure goals. He declared that "the following six
goals
are posed as the ends of tenure policy towards which means
should be directed
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

(1) Freedom to develop one's resources and to realize his inalien
able rights to life, liberty and happiness.

(2) Widely distributed rights in land (control over land resources)
to provide the physical resources with which to work and enjoy
life.

(3) Security in the future possession of present landed rights.
(4) Stability of rural institutions including the school, church
and local government.

(5) Efficiency of production directed towards the maximization of
the produce from the resources in which rights are held.

(6)

Conservation of resources in which rights are held or over which
control is ex;t:"cised.1132

JOHarold Hoffsommer, "Progress of Tenure Groups," Journal of Farm
Economics 23, no. 1 (1941), p. 210.
l
of Land and
J Conrad H. Hamma r, "The Land Tenure Ideal," Journal Public Utility Economics 19, no. 1 (1943), pp. 78-81.
--

-

32
John F. Timmons, "Land Tenure Policy Goals," Journal of Land and
Public Utility Economics 19, no. 1 (1943), pp. 167-79.
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When the North Central Land Tenure Research Committee reviewed avail
able research data the following year, it concluded that (1) adequate farm
income, (2) security of tenure and (3) opportunity for personal and com
munity development were necessary objectives, or goals, that were basic
to constructive tenure policies.33
In the same year a committee of the Association of Land Grant Colleges
and Universities agreed that owner-operation should remain the tenure
pattern, but concluded that "the farmer's security and freedom in the use
of land and his share in farm income are o more significance than whether
1,
he is called an owner, tenant or laborer.11 ..rr

�

In 1945, the U. S. Department of Agriculture declared that "public
policy ought to encourage the development of owner-operated family farms
and be directed towards these primary objectives:
(1)

An equitable distribution of farm income.

(2)

Conservation and development of farm land and buildings.

(3)

Effective farm work and efficient production

(4)

Wide distribution of the control over farm land

(5)

Maximum freedom of action for individuals

(6)

Equality of opportunity, dignity, and self respect for all
tenure groups.

( ?)

Reasonable security for the individual in his possession of
rights in land.

(8)

A wholesome, well-integrated and stable community.1135

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

. .

33
North Central Land Tenure Research Committee, Improving Farm
Tenure in the Midwest (North Central Regional Publication no. 2;;-r11inois
Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 502 (1944), pp. 146-49.
J4
Postwar Agri cultural Policy, Association of Land Grant Colleges
and Universities (1944), pp. 30-31.
35

Farm Tenure Improvement in the United States, u. s. Department of
Agriculture Interbureau Committee on Postwar Programs, mimeographed
preliminary (1945), p. 56.
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One year later the land tenure committee of the Northern Great Plains
Agricultural Advisory Committee accepted (1) adequate income, (2) security
of tenure, (3) stability of rural life, (4) land conservation and develop
ment, and (5) more owner operation as "an effective means of furthering
other tenure objectives.1136 .
At the International Conference on Family Farms held in Chicago in
1946, Belshaw declared that a desirable tenure system should
prevent waste or encourage conservation,

(1)

(2) provide the opportunity or freedom of farming and improvement,
(3) encourage efficient sized farms,
(4)

encourage entry of well-qualified farmers regardless of their
capital,

(5) provide security of tenure,
(6) avoid speculative booms and bursts in land prices,
(?)

encourage wage rates comparable to other occupations, and

(8)

increase stability of net income.37

At the same conference a committee chaired by E. B. Hill, on the
"Place of Ownership and Tenancy," declared that "the weak spots in farm
tenancy
are (a) insecurity of tenure; (b) inadequate farms--farms
too small, soil productivity low, farm improvements not maintained; (c)
lack of managerial control by the tenant; (d) incompetent management;
(e) inadequate family incomes; (f) poor housing; (g) lack of tenant par
ticipation in community affairs; (h) lack of reimbursement for improve
ments made and for damage done by the tenant.1138
•

•

•

36rmproving Farm and Ranch Tenure in the Northern Plains, Northern
Great Plains Agricultural Advisory Council Report 1, Montana Agricultural
Experiment Station Bulletin 436 (1946), pp. 4-5 .
37Horace Belshaw, "Land Tenure and the Problem of Tenure Reform in
New Zealand," Family Farm Policl6 ed. Ackerman and Harris (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 19 ), pp. 193-99.
38E. B. Hill and others, Family Farm Policy, p. 425 .
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Another committee, chaired by Hoffsommer on "Measures to Improve
Tenure Conditions of Family Farms," listed as problems "(l) security and
stability of occupancy, (2) conservation and improvement of farming, (3)
structural improvements and other provisions for tenants, (4) rental
rates, and (5) cooperation between owner and tenant. 1139
A third committee on "Government and Tenure Improvement," chaired
by Benedict, found that legislation was needed to
(1)

Compensate the tenant for the value of his unexhausted improve
ments and penalize him for his waste, damages, or failure to
meet other obligations.

(2)

Provide security of tenure through automatic renewal and
compensation for unjustified disturbance.

(3)

Provide reasonable freedom of cropping.

(4) Protect the tenant against excessive rentals.
(5)

Provide adequate housing. 40

Harris and Ackerman summarized the goals of Belshaw and the com
mittees of the conference in twelve points, but in discussing farm ten
ancy they said, "lack of managerial control on the part of the tenant
is a major shortcoming everywhere, although admittedly more pronounced
in some places than others. This has an adverse effect upon securing
maximum production efficiency for the tenant is not free to choose a
balanced combination of enterprises, he is handicapped in the develop
ment of livestock, and his short-time viewpoint forces him to have little
concern about planning crop rotations and following conservational
practices
where the tenant is not assured of occupancy long enough
to get the benefit from capital developments or where he has no right
of compensation for improvements when he leaves the farm," he is afraid
to improve for fear of losing the farm or being charged a higher
rental. 41
•

•

•

39H. Hoffsommer and others,
Family Farm Policy, p. 441.
40
Murray R. Benedict and others, Family Farm Policy, pp. 488-89.
4�
arshall Harris and Joseph Ackerman, "Interpretive Summary of
the Conference," Family Farm Policy, pp. 25-26.
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Harris listed the following tenure objectives or goals at the
Caribbean Land Tenure Symposium in 1946 :
Responsible freedom of personal action .
F,quality and dignity o f all tenure groups .
Secure possession of rights in land.
Equitable distribution of rights in property.
Conservation and development of physical resources .
6. Highly efficient utilization of productive resources.
7 . F,quitable distribution of income .
8 . Well integrated community life. 42

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

A year after the International Farm Family Conference, Heady wrote
an article on leasing which appeared to question most of the problems
and goal� developed by the conference . 43 To Heady the major problem of
society, and certainly of agriculture, is inefficiency. He cited im
perfect leasing systems as one cause of agricultural inefficiency and
formulated rules to overcome the imperfections . These rules were in
tended to provide the tenant with freedom to allocate resources as
prices and costs direct in the interest of greater efficiency.
That the lack of the four F ' s may not affect efficiency was indi
cated by several studies which compared share tenants and owner
operators . Little or no evidence was found that share tenants farmed
less efficiently than did owners . 44
4

� rshall
Agricultural
1949) , p . 383.
bean Commission

,2!!

Harris, "Objectives o f Land Tenure Policy , " Readings
Policy, ed. O . B. Jesness ( Philadelphia : Blakiston Co . ,
Reprinted from Caribbean Land Tenure Symposium, Carib
( Trinidad, 1946), pp. 30-48 .

43
Earl O . Heady, "Economics of Farm Leasing Systems, " Journal of
Farm Economics 29 , no. 3 (1947) . This article was later slightly �
revised and republished as Chap. 20 in his Economics of Agricultural
Production and Resource Use (New York : Prentice-Hall, Inc. , 195 2).

44
see D . Gale Johnson, "Resource Allocation Under Share Contracts , "
Journal of Political Economics 58 (April 1950 ) , p . 118 . (His evidence
consisted mainly of a comparison of net cash and net share rents from
1925 to 1946 . ) ; E . O . Heady and Earl W. Kehrberg, Relationship of Crop
Share and Cash Leasing Systems to Farming Efficien , Iowa Agricultural
Experiment Station Bulletin 386 ( 1952) , pp . 635 , 6�; Walter G. Miller,
Walter E. Chryst and Howard W. Ottoson, Relative Efficiencies of Farm
Tenure Classes in Intra Firm Resource Allocation (North Centra"l"°Region
al Publication 84) Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station Research Bulle
tin 461 ( 1958) , pp. 334-5 ; and W. L. Gibson, Jr. , Renting Farms in
Southside Virginia, ( Southeast Land Tenure Research Commission Publica
tion 38), Virginia Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 523 ( 1961) ,
pp. 30-34.

�
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Contrary to his expectations , Sanderson found that in the adjoining
deep loess areas of Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska and Kansas, crop-share ten
ants were more efficient crop producers than either owner-operators or
livestock-share tenants.
In overall efficiency, however , livestock-share
tenants excelled, whereas th re was little difference between crop-share
tenants and owner-operators . a5
In the same soil area of Nebraska, Neuman and Ottoson found that share
tenants used less inputs per acre than either owner-operators or livestock
share tenants, but that crop-share farmers made about $1,200 more net f m
income than owner-operators and $ 1 , 200 less than livestock-share farms. �
Barlowe noted that although emphasis on goals has changed with time ,
the central core of these goals has been the desire for
( 1) a wide distribution of property rights ,
( 2) opportunity for every man to manage his business,
( J) adequate sized farms ,
( 4) efficient use of land over time , and
( 5) maximum security and stability of possession consistent with
good management . 47
These may appear to be different from the four F's, but they are not .
Item 1 has been achieved by the equivalent of "fair rents , " i . e . "fair
sale , " by the government homestead laws and by fair credit terms . Item
2 is obviously the same as freedom of operation. Item J calls for free
dom to enlarge the farm, an improvement comparable to enlarging the barn
or introducing irrigation. Item 4 asks for freedom to improve over time ,
and Item 5 asks for fixity or security of tenure.

45

John T. Sanderson, " Relative Efficiency of Alternative Tenure
Arrangements" (M. S . thesis , Iowa State University , 1960) , pp . 71, 139
and Table 12; or see Virgil L . Hurlburt, Use of Farm Resources as Condi
tioned .£y Tenure Arrangements ( North Central Regional Publication 151),
Nebraska Agricultural Experiment Station Research Bulletin 215 ( 1964)
which slllTlITlarizes Sanderson ' s work , p . 15 and Table lJ.
6
4 nuane F. Neuman and Howard Ottoson, � of Tenure, Organization
and Resource Use on Farms in Southeast Nebraska , Nebraska Agricultural
Experiment Statiorl"Agricultural Economics Report J2 (1964) , p . iii.
4
7Raleigh Barlowe , Land Resource Economics ( Englewood Cliffs,
N. J . : Prentice-Hall , Inc . , 1958), p . 435 .
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As mentioned above, the Interregional Land Tenure Research Committee,
in its "Gray Report, " held that "the functions of tenure arrangements
be come the creation of ne cessary incentives and means conducive to : (1)
efficient resour ce use, (2) stability of resour ce productivity and ( J )
equality of a ccess to resour ces among individuals" (p. 2). The inter
pretation usually placed on these three items is that they are tenure
goals. Yet it appears that the three F's--fixity of tenure, freedom to
improve, and freedom to operate--may be more immediate goals . The report
de clares that the debt-free full owner "has the greatest freedom to or
ganize his resources and has maxi.mum se curity of tenure expe ctations .
The debt-free full owner can choose investments (enterprises) that will
yield the greatest return over time with assurance that his length of
tenure will permit his gaining the returns from these investments . Sim
ilarly, he is not affe cted by the dissociation of costs and returns be
tween individuals . The full owner can supply as much of each fa ctor as
is e conomically feasible, knowing that he will re ceive the full return
from every unit employed, whereas the tenant can employ resources only to
the point where the last unit employed is equal to his share of the addi
tional returns produced" (p. 9).
This quotation, and the dis cussion that foll ows concerning mortgaged
owner-operators and tenants, make it clear that for these two groups the
a cquisition of more of the se curity of tenure and freedom of operation and
improvement en joyed by full owners is the immediate goal of research ac
tivity which perfect market theory suggests should result in greater effi
cien cy. In essence then, the argument is the same as Heady's, and analysis
suggests that fixity of tenure, freedom of improvement,and freedom of
operation are the re cognized immediate tenure goals.
How helpful are goals of efficien cy, equality and stability as guides
in giving farmers more se curity and freedom? One can only agree with
Ottoson, Wunderlich and Diesslin that they "are so general, so obscure,
that they are of little help empirically.1148 Nonetheless, the word effi
cien cy appears frequently in their discussion of the 26 areas of land
tenure research. Efficien cy, equality and stability are mentioned as
obje ctives of research on getting started in farming. " A chieving Effi
ciency in Agricultural Land Use" is the first area dis cussed . Under this
heading the authors say, "Tenure arrangements will obstruct efficiency if
they do not en courage enlargement of farms to meet technological changes;
do not give se curity of tenure that will lead to adoption of effe ctive
long range farm plans and improved farming pra cti ces; and do not give a
fair division of costs and returns between the individuals involved"
(p . 4).

48Howard W . Ottoson, Gene Wunderlich, and Howard G. Diesslin, Land

Tenure Resear ch, S cope and Nature, p. J .
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Efficiency still appears to be the main objective, but sub-objectives
appear to be fixity or security of tenure, freedom to improve by enlarging
the farm, freedom to adopt other long range plans and improved practices,
and determination of " the elements in the market situation that cause land
prices, whether the use price in rental or value in transfer of ownership,
to fail to reflect properly the productivity of land"--in short, fair
rents or fair prices.
In discussing leasing arrangements (p. 8) the authors note that prob
lems are created (1) when costs are not shared as the product is shared,
(2) when discriminatory rents are charged, and ( 3 ) when short terms create
insecure tenure. As the discussion of Heady's rules pointed out, the four
F's are implied as objectives by these problems. Whether the achievement
of these goals will result in greater efficiency is perhaps beside the
point, unless one is willing to say that people should endure arry frustra
tion that does not affect efficiency--or a sore should not be of concern,
no matter how irritating, unless it affects one's efficiency.
The views expressed in the
can be summarized:
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works published between

Problems, objectives, goals £!:_ incentives
Fixity or security of tenure
Freedom of improvement or long-run management
Freedom of operation or short-run management
Fair or equitable rents
Economic efficiency
Opportunity or equality (various meanings)
Soil conservation (improvement? )
Stability of rural institutions
Ownership (as a means to the first three items? )
Economic stability

1936

and

1962

Freguency

22
18
17
10
14
6
7
3
5

3

There seems to be general agreement among these research workers
that the first four items--the four F's--are important aspects of tenure
that should receive attention because their lack constitutes a problem ;
and the goal or objective should be to provide them, if only as an
" incentive" to greater efficiency--the fourth-ranked problem or goal.
A capitalistic, free enterprise society is founded on the notion that
the greatest efficiency results when private firms have freedom to allocate
their resources as costs and prices direct. To the extent that the four
F's give farmers this freedom, it is logical to believe that efficiency
may be increased. The fact that increased efficiency has not been
found in several empirical comparisons of owner-operators, cash tenants
and share-rent tenants, does not weaken the logic.
Rather, it suggests
that there may be other reasons for lack of arry difference--custom, lease
provision, or fear of losing the farm. But these studies do raise the
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question of whether lack of efficiency is a tenure problem and whether its
removal is a meaningful tenure objective or goal. If an automobile engine
stall s , the problem is not one of miles per gallon of fuel, or efficiency.
More likely, it is a problem of ignition or fuel supply to the engine .
The precise problem--theref 0re the precise objective of the mechanic--is
a matter to be determined rather than assumed.
Opportunity as a goal seems to have no generally accepted meaning .
Sometimes it refers to opportunity to acquire fixity of tenure , sometimes
to opportunity to manage the busine s s . In either case it appears to be a
synonym for one or more of the four F ' s .
Soil conservation as a goal suggests that farmers should have free
dom to conserve as well as to improve . (These freedoms do not neces sarily
imply freedom to waste . ) Ownership is one means of acquiring the four F ' s
that i s justly popular with farmers . Stability of rural institutions
seems to be closely related to fixity of tenure. Finally, economic stabil
ity, like economic efficiency, does not appear to be a tenure problem but
a problem of society as a whole .
VI .

Farm-Tenure Goals of Landlords

Historically, the four F ' s have been stated from the tenant ' s view
point, and this view has been accepted. Yet if these tenure goals are to
be achieved, they must also be attractive to farm landlords . This is
true because in the United States the farm landlord is generally in a
stronger bargaining position than is the tenant, especially when the land
lord has a productive farm attractive to many land-hungry tenant s . Unles s
the farm landlord can more easily achieve hi s goals , he i s not likely to
give the tenant either greater fixity of tenure or freedom of operation
or improvement .
What, then, are the landlord ' s goals? Perhaps what is desired is
an ideal lease that would give the landlord security as to the amount of
rent, security as to the payment of the rent, and security as to the pro
ductivity of his property or reversionary interest. Stated from a differ
ent standpoint--the landlord wants freedom from poor farming , poor rents
and poor upkeep of the farm.
What are the logical or theoretical reasons for believing that these
hypothetical problems and goals of landlords may be valid? First, a land
owner who proposes to lease his farm is obviously not interested in farm
ing it himself . Nor is he interested in selling the farm. If he had
this in mind , his main problem or goal would be to get a fair price.
Once the price was paid, he would probably have no further economic prob
lems or objectives with regard to this farm except what any citizen might
have or as a matter of sentimental attachment.
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If the landowner were to accept a partial payment of JO percent or
more and a note secured by a mortgage for the balance , his concern
would be great. He would want to be reasonably sure that the new owner
could farm well enough to make the payments as scheduled. In the event
of default, the mortgage holder would want to be sure that the value of
the property had been maintained sufficiently so that it would be worth
the unpaid balance in the event that he were compelled to foreclose.
Because such risk would be small , this is not usually a serious problem.
However, if the landowner is selling on a land contract with perhaps a
10 percent down payment, he is likely to be more concerned about whether
the buyer is a good farmer �ho will maintain or improve the farm, cul
tivate it properly, and make payments on time. Failure to maintain the
farm or to make the payments could result in a serious loss for the
seller.
If the landowner is interested in leasing the land--that i s , in
selling only the possession, use, and enjoyment of his land for a
definite term in exchange for a rent--he is certainly interested in
getting a good "buyer" or tenant. If a fixed cash rent is to be paid,
the landlord ' s main concern will be security of rent, of payment, and
security of the productivity of his property.
If the rent is an objectively determined flexible cash rent,
which neither tenant nor landlord can affect after the lease is signed,
the degree of concern remains much the same as in the fixed cash rent.
Because the tenant can have a serious effect upon the landlord ' s rever
sionary estate , the landlord is much more concerned in getting and
keeping a good farmer than he would be were he selling the land under
any of the methods discussed above .

When the landlord elects to lease for a crop-share, the tenant be
comes even more important. If he can get and keep a good tenant , he
is assured a good job of improvement , a good job of management , and a
fair share as rent . The problem is that frequently the tenant is
deficient in one or more of these aspects . Hence the share landlord
lacks (1) security as to the amount of rent, (2) security of rent pay
ment and ( 3 ) security of his property. Cash rents eliminate the first
of these problems but not the last two .
Because the share landlord i s uncertain about rent, he may, and
often doe s , specify in detail the crops to be grown, their acre s , the
variety of seed to be used, the kind and amount of fertilizers to be
applied, the weed, insect and disease controls to be used and so on.
Such activities on the part of the landlord--and the hiring of pro
fessional farm managers--are evidence of the importance of the se prob
lems and goals under share-rent leases.
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Some landowners , however , are not interested in selling either their
freehold or their leasehold. What they are interested in is either some
kind of a partnership or an employer-employee relationship. Under some
partnerships each party owns the same share of all resources. Other part
nerships are less clear. O� these the livestock-share lease is an example.
Often one party owns all the land and buildings and half the livestock
while the other party furnishes all the power, machinery, labor and half
the livestock ; all costs and returns are shared equally. Whether this is
a legal partnership is debatable, but certainly it must be at least a
quasi-partnership, otherwi se it would not seem so necessary to stress that
it is a lease and that no partnership is intended.
When the crop-share landlord feels that it is necessary to dictate
the farming plans in the detail suggested above, the result can only be a
kind of quasi-partnership which differs from the livestock-share lease
mainly in that the livestock is not shared. If , as sometimes happens , the
landlord exercises full control over the farming plans , the tenant may be
only slightly different from the sharecropper of the cotton and tobacco
plantations of the South or the metayer in Europe. Finally, there are
those landowners who hire a working manager to carry out plans for the
operation of the farm. The relationship here is that of employer-employee.
Unfortunately, the distinction between a leasehold and a partnership is
not clear. This leads to much confusion. Does the landowner want a ten
ant, an employee, or both? If he wants a tenant, then it appears that his
problems are likely to be insecurity as to the amount of rent , insecurity
as to the payment of rent, and insecurity as to the maintenance of his
property. Therefore , his major goals would be to achieve security of rent
and property.
Empirical evidence supports the theory that landlords are primarily
concerned about the amount of rent , the payment of their rent, and the
protection of the property. For example, Pond asked 3 , 300 randomly
selected Minnesota landlords why their last tenant moved ; 49 the 22 per
cent who replied gave the following reasons :
( percent)
1. Tenant moved to ( a) a better farm
23
13
( b) a purchased farm
14
( c) other work or retirement
( d) illness or death
5
2. Tenant was unsatisfactory
33
3. Tenant failed to pay rent
8
3
4 . Landlord-tenant disagreement
5. Other
1
100

Total

49

George A. Pond , Farm Tenancy in Minnesota , Minnesota Agricultural
Experiment Station Bulletin 353 (194IT, p. 40.
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Landlord concern with good farming and fair rents is indicated by the
fact that 41 percent of the tenants moved for these reasons ( Items 2 and

3).

In Illinois, farm landlords attending county extension meetings chose
6 items from a list of 18 tenant characteristics . 50 The most popular
choices and the percentage choosing each were as follows :
( percent)

1.
2.

3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10 .
11.

Tenant with adequate power and machinery
Tenant who will help build up farm
Tenant who is willing to work
Tenant who keeps up with new ideas
Tenant to make small repairs and keep place neat
Timely planting and harve sting
Fair sharing of costs
Clean attractive farm
Written lease
Cooperative planning
Courteous and re spectful treatment

71
70
69
66
61
42
41
36
32
28
25

The importance of good farming and hence good share rent is indicated by
Items 1-4 and 6. The importance of maintaining the property is indicated
by Items 5 and 8 .
In contrast, Illinois farm tenants who attended the same meetings
indicated the following preferences:
Productive farm
Landlord willing to make improvements
Adequate buildings
Modern house
Lease longer than one year
Written lease
Fair sharing of costs
Landlord willing to try new ideas
Courteous and respectful treatment
Appreciation for extra work done
Repayment for tenant-made improvements

( percent)
90
60
58
56
47
41
40

32
31

25
20

Thus if landlords want good farmers, they need productive, well-improved
farms and must provide some security of tenure, freedom to improve, free
dom to operate, and fair sharing of costs.
50

Franklin J . Reiss, "What Do Tenants and Landlords Want, " Farm Man
agement Facts and Opinions to Help You, Newsletter no. 82 (21 February
1965) .
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In South Dakota, a mail questionnaire was sent to 1,200 randomly
chosen landlords. 51 Of the 317 who replied, 103 said that their previous
tenant left at their request. The reasons given for requesting that the
tenant leave were :
( percent)
Poor manager
Lazy
Dishonest
Other reasons
No reply

47
3
12
JO
8

In Oklahoma, several hundred farm landlords who attended farm land
lord-tenant hearings in 1938 gave these reasons why tenants move : 5 2
( percent)
Poor farming
To get better farm
Poor income
Poor upkeep of property

51
17
16
16

The same landlords gave the following reasons for landlord-tenant
disagreements :
(percent)
32
27
21
19

Poor farming
Division of crops
Indefinite agreements
Destruction of property
for :

These landlords also said that when they selected tenants they looked
( percent)
29
28
22
21

Power and equipment
Honesty and dependability
Good past record
Good worker

5�. L. Berry, Share Rents, p. lJ.

52 11Farm Landlord-Tenant Hearings," Oklahoma Extension Service,
mimeographed (1938), p. 5 .
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In contrast, tenants said that they looked for these characteristics
in selecting a landlord:
( percent)
37
31
20
12

Better land
Better improvements
Water and pasture
Agreeable landlord

In Iowa , Timmons asked 145 tenants and 131 landlords what they looked
for in each other. 53 Their replies were :
Tenant s •
replies
( percent)
Ability to cooperate and get along
Honesty and integrity
Farm experience
Other
Total

Landlords '
replies
( percent,'

52
25
16
7

21
26
42
11

100

100

Again good farming and fair rents are suggested as the main goals by the
replies of these landlords.
Farm lease forms are also an indication of what landlords want since
commercial forms are almost always prepared for landlords rather than ten
ants. Some of the se forms merely say that the tenant will farm as the
landlord directs and some say that farming plans shall be made jointly.
Others such as the model " Crop-Share-Cash Farm Lease" (AD561, March 1960),
prepared and distributed by the U. S. Department of Agriculture, provide
much space to specify the crops , the acres of each crop, the location of
the crop, the seed variety, the kind and amount of fertilizer to be used
and many other provisions. Commercial lease forms and many forms distri
buted by State extension services contain liens on the tenant ' s crops to
guarantee the payment of the rent. A one-year or year-to-year term is
al.most invariably used to insure a good job of farming , a fair rent, pay
ment of the rent and upkeep of the property.
Both the logic and the survey results ( sketchy though they are)
suggest that landlord and tenant goals may be complementary in many case s .
Landlords want to get and keep good tenants who can and will take care of
53

John F. Timmons, Improving Farm Rental Arrangements in Iowa, Iowa
Agri cultural Experiment Station Research Bulletin 393 (1953J:" p. 83 .
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minor repairs and upkeep problems , do a good job of farming and pay a fair
rent. Tenants want to get and keep good farms on which they can make
improvements , do a good job of farming as they see it and likewise pay a
fair rent. Thus it seems that there would be much less leasing were it
not for the mutual or complementary goals achieved by leasing.
There are of course, many exceptions . Not all land.owners and farmers
would agree to these goals . Some landowners are definitely interested in
keeping the management of the farm largely in their own hands and prefer
to treat their tenants as partners or employees rather than as independent
contractors. Sharecropping in the South is an example , but some share
rent leases are little better . Still other landlords tend to think of
their tenants as partners in which both improvement and operation are joint
responsibilities, as is usually the case under share-rent agreement s . But
even here many share-rent landlords are content to leave most of these
problems to the tenant, reserving by means of the short-term lease the
right to remove him if he does a poor job or fails to pay a fair rent.
The evidence suggests that the latter class includes many landlords
who would heartily subscribe to the four goals. Certainly they are
interested in getting and keeping good tenants for the very reason that
they do not want to be concerned or bothered with problems of improvements ,
day-to-day management , and doubts about the fairness of the rent. But
because the share tenant ' s management does affect the rent, the land.lord
often finds himself involved in the tenant ' s farming plans , worried about
the amount of the rent, and using the short term to protect himself
against flagrant abuse . Because the short term limits the tenant ' s secur
ity of tenure , it also limits his freedom to improve .

VII.

Summary and Conclusions

The purpose of this paper was to determine if pos sible the major
farm tenure problems and goals of both landlords and tenants . Evidence
from English and American history, from tenure studies and from farm
tenure research workers was examined .
English history reveals that the four F ' s were the relevant tenure
goals that were finally made uniform by tenancy legislation after at
least two centuries of effort. Today the English tenant has great secur
ity of tenure , freedom of improvement, freedom of cropping and full
opportunity to seek adjustment of rents that he deems unfair. There can
be no doubt as to the objectives sought because they are incorporated in
the law for all to see. They may have achieved too well for the future
of the leasing system, a further indication of the strength of these
tenure goals--the four F ' s .
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The American colonists were also interested in the four F ' s , but the
abundance of raw land and the scarcity of labor made it possible for them
to achieve their objective by fee-simple ownership. Investors found that
there was more money in buying large blocks of land, subdividing and
selling it to settlers than in holding it for leasing as was done in Eng
land.
Ownership, hence the four F ' s , was easily achieved in part because
Congress passed numerous credit acts, the Graduation Act, the Preemption
Act, the various homestead act s ; and it created the Federal Land Bank
system and the Farmers Home Administration, both intended to make owner
operators out of tenants .
Despite all efforts at increasing owner-operation, farm tenancy has
increased to the point where more than 50 percent of the land in much of
the Corn Belt is now under lease. In some areas it is as high as 75 per
cent . What do the landlords and tenants say that their major tenure
problems are? Such evidence as is available indicates that the most
important problems are the lack of the four F ' s--fixity of tenure , free
dom to improve, freedom to operate , and fair rents.
Land-tenure research workers also seem to be in general agreement
that lack of the four F ' s constitutes the ma jor tenure problem. In
recent years there has been much talk about efficiency, stability and
equality as social goals which tenure arrangements should achieve . How
ever , an examination of the proposed arrangements reveals that they would
give the tenant fixity of tenure, by one means or another ; freedom to
improve by compensating him for the value of his unexhausted improvements ;
and freedom of operation by eliminating discriminatory rents among crops
and among such resources as buildings , pasture and cropland.
Although there is much less literature on the problems and goals of
farm landlords , the evidence , such as it is, indicates that the lack of
security of the amount of rent, particularly under share-rent leases , is
the major problem. Next comes the landlord ' s insecurity about the
preservation of the productivity of his property. Thus the landlord' s
goals are to get a tenant who will do a good job of farming, pay a fair
rent , and maintain the farm.
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PUBLIC LAND DISPOSAL BY LEASEHOLD AND FREEHOLD IN CANADA, AUSTRALIA,
NEW ZEALAND, AND THE NETHERLANDS
Paul O'Rourke
I.

LAND POLICIES OF TWO CANADIAN PRAIRIE PROVINCES
Introduction

Alberta and Saskatchewan are the only Canadian Provinces which
dispose of their public lands for intensive agriculture by leasehold as
well as by freehold. The history, geography and land disposition policies
of the two Provinces are similar.
During the years of settlement, between 1870 and 1930, the Canadian
government controlled the public lands in the Prairie Provinces. Its land
policy closely resembled that of the United States--making land available
in fee simple and encouraging rapid settlement.
When the Dominion government relinquished the land to the Provinces
in 1930, the drought and rural depression of the twenties and thirties
forced the Provincial governments to reevaluate land policy. Rapid set
tlement gave way to conservation as a primary objective of land policy,
and the farmers' lack of capital influenced the Provinces to adopt a
policy of leasing the lands . Since the 1930s both Provinces have con
tinued to lease , but with different emphasis. Alberta has stressed leas
ing as a temporary alternative to freeholding. Saskatchewan stressed
leasing between 1945 and 1962 , but in 1955 it allowed veterans who were
holding leases to purchase their lands , and in 1962 all other leaseholders
were permitted to purchase.
Geographically, the Provinces are each divided into three soil zones .
A Brown Soil Zone in the South was once a wheat growing region, but since
the drought of the 1930's , it has been primarily a grazing area. Today
the public land is generally leased for grazing purposes. This region is
surrounded on the north and east by a more fertile Black Soil Zone in

Paul O'Rourke is Assistant Professor of History at South Dakota
State University, Brookings , South Dakota.
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which oats and barley are important crops. Here , fee simple ownership
is the rule . The northernmost tier, extending to the Canadian shield,
is the Grey-Wooded Soil Zone, a largely underdeveloped region suitable
for legumes , oats , and barley ( although not wheat) but requiring exten
sive clearing, breaking and drainage . This is the region where the
Provincial governments lease most of their land for intensive agri
culture and where their experience is most relevant for American land
policy. l
Saskatchewan Land Policies
Saskatchewan has emphasized leasing its public lands more than
any other Canadian Province . In 1953 the Saskatchewan Royal Connni ssion
on Agriculture and Rural Life justified leasing on several grounds : ·
1 . Since virtually all of the land leased i s in the Grey-Wooded
Soil Zone and requires extensive government improvements , the govern
ment can recover the cost only through leasing.
2 . These frontier lands are vulnerable to inflation, exceeding
production increases , which would increase the tax and debt burden of
individuals pur chasing freeholds.
3 . A leaseholder is in a much better position than an indebted
owner to obtain adequate machinery and working capital and to operate
a larger unit .
4. The government ' s conservation goals can be more easily at
tained on state-owned land rather than on undersized and undercapital
ized private land.
5 . The government leasing policy probably stimulates better
private leasing arrangements and holds down private rental charges , an
important consideration in a Province where almost half the private
land is leased.

1

c . C. Spence , " Government Policy and Land Use in Western Canada
in Land Economics Institute , University of Illinois , Modern Land Policy
( Urbana, Illinois : University of Illinois Pre s s , 1960), pp."""Jb7-68 ;
V . A. Wood, " Public Land Policy for Alberta , " ( Ph.D. dissertation,
Department of Agricultural Economics , University of Minnesota , 1953 ) ,
pp. 131-33; P. E . Polis chuk, Director of Lands , Province of Saskatchew
an, ( letter, 20 November 1968 ) .
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6 . Through its leasing program the government also helps free
holders to reach economic farm sizes by renting them small parcels of
public land. 2
The Connni ssion ' s analysis of the advantages of leasing was by no
means unique . What is surprising is that Saskatchewan adopted the
leasing policy despite the preference , pointed out by the Commission,
for private ownership in the frontier areas.
The basic explanation for the government ' s persistence in this
policy is the lack of demand for available public lands . The high
cost of improving the land in the Grey-Wooded Soil Zone, high costs
of operation, low crop and livestock prices , the absence of roads and
social amenities have discouraged prospective settlers in an era of
urban immigration. A postwar settlement plan for veterans created
some demand, but since the mid-fifties there has been virtually no
demand for farmland in Saskatchewan. The main goal of the government ' s
land disposal policy in re cent years has been to create economic sizes
of existing farms by leasing public lands to their operators. 3
The settler s ' main pres sure on the government in recent years
has been for the enlargement of their current holdings rather than
for new homesteads. Until lately, the government considered 480 acres
an adequate economic unit if half the unit were suitable for crop
production. The Commission in 1953 noted the paucity of studies on
the rate of return from agricultural lands and suggested that 240 acres
of good cropland might be inadequate in the North. The government
eventually acceded to the demand for increasing the maxi.mum from 480
to 800 acres . 4 The number of leases and acres of public lands leased
in 1967 by Saskatchewan follows :
Number
Cultivation leases
Grazing, hay leases , permits

2 , 880
11, 247

Acres
398 , 382 ( arable)
5 , 738, 606

2

saskatchewan Connni ssion on Agriculture and Rural Life, Report �·
2, Land Tenure : Rights and Re sponsibilities in Land Use in Saskatchewan
(Regina , Saskatchewan : Queen' s Printer, 1955J:° pp. 54-68 .
3

Burke G. Vanderhill , "The Decline of Land Settlement in Manitoba
and Saskatchewan, " Economic Geography 38 , no. 3 (1962 ) , pp. 270-73;
A. M. Thomson, Director of Lands , Province of Saskatchewan ( letter , 9
March 1966 ) .
4
c. C. Spence, Modern Land Policy, pp. 378 , 381 ; Saskatchewan Com
mission on Agriculture and Rural Life , Report no . 5 , pp. 88-89.
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Between 1961 and 1967 there were 2 , 431 Provincial sales involving
521 , 106 acres of cultivated land. 5
Rentals are paid prima�ily in cash. The government prefers this
system because the share cropper can cover up his yield and put the
burden of proof on the Province . Sharecropping has declined to such an
extent that the Province granted no lands on share rentals in 1966-67.
Rentals are based on the appraised value of the land, which is
derived from soil productivity ratings ; the se in turn are converted in
to monetary values that fluctuate according to crop prices . In actu
ality, the land is appraised below market values . Each tract is re
evaluated every fifth year, and rents are generally assessed at 6 per
cent of the appraised value . This rate is adjustable ; however, the
adjustments are usually downward. The Commission in 1953 recommended
more flexibility in rental s , claiming they were too high in the initial
years of the lease and too low in later year s . Two unusual provisions
of the standard cultivation lease which benefit the tenant are :
1 . An 8 per cent discount if the rent is paid by December 1 of
the current crop year when it is due . ( Payment may be deferred until
July 31 of the following year because of the quota delivery system of
the Canadian Wheat Board. There is a 6 percent penalty if the rental
is not paid by August. )
2. In years of complete crop failure or ver::r low yield, a com
plete or partial write-off "of rent" :3.,s allowed. 6
Since 1965 , the government will sell--except for fractional land
sales--only to a lessee who has held the land for at least five years
and who has at least 25 percent of his acreage under cultivation. The
minimum price is $20 an acre for arable land and $10 an acre for un
improved land, The government reduce s the selling price by $50 for
every year the lessee holds the land (up to a maximum of $500 or 10
percent of the appraisal price, whichever is greater ) . Purchases on
time require a 20 percent down payment with the balance to be paid
within 30 years .

5

Saskatchewan Department of Agriculture , Annual Report of the
Director of Lands , 12§1 (Regina, Saskatchewan: Queen ' s Printer , 1967) ,
PP• 137-44 .
6
Thomson ( letter, 9 March 1966) ; Saskatchewan Department of
Lands , p. 136 ; "Cash Rental Agricultural Lease , " Saskatchewan Depart
ment of Lands ( Regina, Saskatchewan) ; Saskatchewan Commis sion on Agri
culture and Rural Life , Report no. 5 , pp. 88-89 .
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Lack of security of tenure has been a problem, although it is not
nearly so severe on leased public lands as on the private lands of the
The standard cultivation lease now runs for 10 year s , The
Province,
tenant has priority over other applicants at renewal time, yet the ad
ministration of this provision in Saskatchewan has apparently caused
uncertainty among lessees,
The Commission in 1953 recommended a defi
nite guarantee of the lessee ' s right of renewal,
Ideally, it suggested
abolishing the standard 33-year lease altogether in favor of a combina�
tion of an interim with a perpetual lease. The farmer would receive
an interim lease until he had demonstrated his ability. Then, he would
get a perpetual lease, which the Commission was convinced would guaran
tee security of tenure without the indebtedness handicaps that go with
freeholding , 7
Lack of compensation for improvements has also been a problem in
the northern region where land development requires considerable work,
Under the standard agricultural lease,· the tenant clears and breaks the
The government compensates him for his expenses up to $30 an
land,
acre which he may credit against his rent.
The lessee owns the farm
buildings and fencing and is entitled to compensation upon termination
of his lease,
A popular lease in new settlement areas is . the Project
Lease under which the government clears and breaks 50 acres while the
The tenant may not credit the cost of
tenant clears the brush piles ,
clearing additional lan� against arry of the rental from these 50 acres,
A possible solution to the problem of improvements· is the . Veter
The Province made
ans Lease which leads toward eventual - ownership.
these 10-year leases to World War II veterans as a part of the Dominion ' s
resettlement programs ,
The veteran-lessee received a $2, 320 loan from
the Dominion government which be came an outright grant if he stayed on
the land for 10 years ,
He had to bring all arable land under cultivation
within six years and was allowed remission of rent only for the first
year of cultivation,
After 10 years he was to purchase the land out
right at a price that made allowance for his improvement s . Although the
Veterans Lease is largely a thing of the past, the prospect of eventual
ownership largely solved the problem of lack of compensation for un
exhausted improvements and the grants helped to provide needed capital , 8

?
Spence, Modern Land Policy, p . 378; Saskatchewan Commission on
Agriculture and Rural Life, Report no, 5, p. 90.
8
no,

5,

Saskatchewan Commission on Agriculture and Rural Life , Report
p . 86 .
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The Commission also pointed out some weaknesses of the Province ' s
leasing policy and offered some suggestions for alleviating them:
1. The cost of clearing and breaking the land often exceeded the
$25 per acre the government paid the lessee for this purpose. The
Department of Lands estimated the average cost for the Grey-Wooded Soil
Zone at $26.42 an acre. Since the government was to own these improve
ments, the Commission suggested it pay full compensation for them. If
the government decided it could not afford to pay the full cost of
developing the land, the Commission wondered if the land was worth set
tling. Since 195J the compensation for clearing and breaking has been
raised to $JO an acre.
2. Because the lessee finds it difficult to raise capital since
he can offer no land as security, the Commission recommended that the
government advance him the money before he makes the improvements in
stead of compensating him afterwards as it does at present.
J. The Commission advised that the lessee receive compensation
for such improvements as tree planting and grass seeding which are not
presently remunerable. The Province, however , did not act upon this
recommendation. The Commission also noted, in passing, that cooperative
farms in which several farmers participated have helped to develop new
land in Saskatchewan more rapidly than have farms with individual
lessees. 9
Related to the problem of improvements is the lessee's lack of
capital. The Commission believed that the answer lay with the Domin
ion government ' s various loan programs , which it wanted consolidated
into a proposed "Canadian Farm Credit Administration. " The Connnission
suggested that the three-year period for repaying loans on machinery
be extended, simply because machinery lasts longer than three years.
It also wanted a JO-year repayment period on large government loans and
allowance for prepayment of loans with commensurate interest reductions.
In the private sector it urged bankers to extend more short-term credit
to farmers, and it advised farmers and local communities to stop obtain
ing credit from retail stores and to help themselves by establishing
credit unions. 10
9
Thomson (letter , 9 March 1966) ; Saskatchewan Commission on Agri
culture and Rural Life, Report no. 5 , p. 86 ; Saskatchewan Department
of Lands , p. 1J2.
10
saskatchewan Commission on Agriculture and Rural Life, Report
no. 5, pp. 100-104 ; Polischuk ( letter , 20 November 1968 ) .
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The government does not interfere ve-ry lllllch with the tenant' s
farming activities. The Department of Lands rental contract does allow
it to dictate a plan of tillage, summer fallow, crop rotation, weed
control, and the treatment of grain or other farm produce in order to
enhance productivity. In practice, however, the Department has done
little to implement its contract powers. The Commission urged the 
government to supervise the tenant ' s . conservation activities more
closely. However , the trend has been in the opposite direction · since
the replacement of the crop share lease with a cash rental lease has
substantially reduced the amount of supervision. The Commission also
noted that many lessees were ignorant of the Province ' s land laws and
pointed out that Britain publishes an abbreviated guide to the legis
lation in the form of a handbook. It also urged a more stringent set
tler selection process to eliminate poor farming practices. However,
be cause of the dearth of applications for farm lands , this suggestion
has proved difficult to implement.
Apart from general land policy, many tenants have been dissatisfied
with qelays in official approval of sales and leases resulting from the
high annual turnover rate of local agents of the Lands Department. 11
In conclusion--since northern Saskatchewan is a fringe area neces
sitating extensive improvements , experiences there may have some rele
vance for the Western United States .

Alberta � Policies
While the Province of Alberta also has leased public lands since
the 1930s, its land disposal program differed substantially from
Saskatchewan' s before the latter reversed its policies in 1965. In
Alberta, alienation of public lands has always remained the ultimate
goal with leasing merely a tempora-ry solution. While the Cultivation
Lease has easily been the most important intensive agricultural lease
in Saskatchewan, the Homestead Lease with the right of conversion to
the freehold has been the overwhelming choice in Alberta.
In 1953 Wood , now the Director of Lands in Alberta, recommended
that the Province sell, rather than lease, the land wherever possible . 12
Wood pointed out that Alberta farmers , like farmers in Saskatchewan, New
Zealand, Australia, and the United States , prefer to hold their land in

11
Polis chuk ( letter, 20 November 1968 ) .
1
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A. Wood, " Public Land Policy for Alberta . "
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fee simple because more status is attached to land ownership. They
as sociate leasing with insecure tenure, lack of compensation for im
provements , and lack of freedom of operation. Wood agreed with the
Saskatchewan Connni s sion ' s view that leasing could often prove more
beneficial to the farmer than freeholding . Yet, unlike the Saskatch
ewan Connni ssion, he concluded that the vital consideration was the
inability of the average farmer to grasp the advantages of leasing.
He recommended farm ownership because it resulted in " a greater will
ingnes s to sacrifice time , money, and labor for development " ( p . 150 ) .
Since the 19JOs , Alberta has disposed of its lands suited for
intensive agriculture by sale , Homestead Lease , or by short-term Cul
tivation Lease. In recent years the Province has virtually abandoned
lea sing in favor of freeholding. Implementing Wood ' s recommendations ,
it has ceased issuing Homestead Leases although 2600 such leases are
still in force. Wood envisioned Cultivation Leases as stopgap measures
in the southern grazing areas where some land might be turned over to
farming under modern farming techniques on an experimental basis. If
found suitable for farming , the land could be sold outright. Yet,
leases are still important on Alberta public lands , and as of 1967, the
following were in effect :
Number
2 , 600
830
1 , 155
6 , 444

Homestead Leases
Cultivation Leases
Miscellaneous leases
Grazing Leases and Permits

Total acres
673,333
159 ,634
74, 596
4, 969 ,459

In the same year the following sales were in proce s s :
Number
4 , 199
1 , 710
1 , 551

Homestead sales in force
Agricultural farm sales
Public land sales

Total acres

��-

1 , 115 , 290
307 , 927
231, 584

As these figures indicate , there is considerable demand for land in
Alberta. Most of this demand is found in the Peace River Valley in
the Northwest.
As in Saskatchewan, there has been agitation in Alberta for
increasing the size of public land grants to form more viable eco
nomic units . In recent years the Province has increased the maximum
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area g ranted from 320 to 800 acre s , of which half must be cultivat
able . 1 3
Rentals are largely paid in cash rather than in crop share s . Under
the Homestead Lea ses, however , the farmer is not required to pay rent
on lands he breaks himself during the first three years . In the fourth
year he pays one-eighth of the value of his crop. On lands already
under cultivation he pays one-fourth of the value of his crop as rent .
He may apply for title after five years by paying $100 a quarter or
$300 a half section. In the next five years 20 percent of his title
payment is written off provided he has fulfilled the government ' s re
quirements for improving the land. During the entire 10-year period he
pays no taxe s , the se being calculated in the government ' s share of his
crop. At the end of 10 years he a cquires title .
Under Cultivation Leases the rent is based on the asses sed value
of the land. The government may forgive the lessee his rent for the
first four years for breaking the land. At the end of this period, or
earlier if 25 percent or more of the land is under cultivation, the rent
i s a minimum of 30 cents an acre . Under Cultivation Leases, the tenant
is not automatically entitled to convert to fee simple ownership as are
Home stead Lease tenant s . However , he has first choice if the Department
of Lands decides to sell the land.
Under the government ' s Homestead Lease policy, the purchaser may
also be forgiven his rent and taxes for up to four year s , after which
he is required to make his payments in no more than 19 annual install
ments with 4 . 5 percent annual interest on the balance. The Department
of Lands bases its rent on the assessed value of the land and the cost
to the government of providing access to the land.
Agricultural farm sales are used less frequently and are generally
for more developed lands . The purchaser ' s equity is in cash rather
than in leasing and breaking, and the payment term is generally shorter .
A down payment of at least 20 percent of the pur chase price is required
with the remainder to be paid in installments with 4 . 5 percent annual
interest on the balance . The years allowed for payment are as follows :
10 years when the purchase price is less than $1 ,500 ;
15 years when the purchase price is from $ 1 , 500 to $ 3 , 500 ;
20 years when the pur chase price is $3 , 500 or more.

l3

Alberta Department of Lands, Annual Report, 1967, ( &imonton:
L. S . Wall , 1967) , pp. 25-29 ; Province of Alberta, An Act Respe cting
Public Lands , 1966 ( Edmonton: Queen ' s Printer, 1966}, p. 27 ; Von
Eckhard Ehlers , "Landpolitik und Landpotential in den nordlichen Kana
dis chen Prairie provinzen, "� Auslandis che Landwirt, V ( January 1966 ) ,
p. 55.
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Wood considered alternate methods of consum mating sales and lease
disposals. He preferred sealed bids to public auctions because he be
lieved that auctions unduly inflated the value of the land and that
sealed bids came closer to t�e market value . He suggested that where
the available land was inadequate to form an economic farm unit, the
government should sell the land to the local farmer who most needed it. 14
In Alberta as in Saskatchewan, there appears to be little disagreement
with the government ' s rental rates or sale prices based on market value .
Insecurity of tenure has not been a serious problem since the
government ' s land policy has been geared to eventual ownership. Home
stead Leases are granted for a period of 20 years with a right of re
newal for another 20 years , thus providing ample time to convert the
lea sehold to a freehold. Cultivation Leases are limited to 10 year s ,
with the lessee having first preference if the government wishes to
renew it. As noted previously, Cultivation Leases may be converted to
purchase agreements if the land is found suitable for agriculture.
Wood recommended in 1953 that the lessee no longer be allowed to
as sign his lease. Such assignments were often quite profitable because
the government ' s rental rates were generally below the open market
rental rates. Provided that he received equitable compensation for
improvements, Wood saw no reason why a lessee should make a profit at
the expense of the government. While his recommendation was not im
plemented, the shift away from leasing since 1953 has helped to resolve
the problem. On home stead sales the Province does not permit the
purchaser to transfer the land unless he has performed the cultivation
duties prescribed by the government for at least four years . 15
14spenc e , Modern Land Policy, p. 3 7 7 ; Government of the Province
of Alberta , The Public Lands Act, 1966 , Cultivation Lease and Permit
Regulations ( Edmonton: Queen' s Printer , 1966) , pp. 1- 3 ; Government of
the Province of Alberta , The Public Lands Act, 'j[J66, Homestead Sale
( Edmonton: Queen ' s Printer , 1966) , pp. 9 , 11-1 ; Government of the
Province of Alberta , The Public Lands Act, 1966, A ricultural �
Sales Regulations ( Edmonton: Queen' s Printer , 196�) , p. 3 ; Wood,
" Public Land Policy for Alberta , " pp. 164-66.

l5
v. A . Wood, "Alberta ' s Land Policy, Past and Present , " Journal
of Farm Economics 33 ( November 1951) , p. 741 ; Alberta Department of
Lands , Annual Report, 196 7 ; Wood, " Public Land Policy for Alberta , "
pp. 160-61 ; Province of Alberta , An Act Respe cting Public Lands , p. 3 6 .
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Compensation for improvements has not been an important problem of
Alberta' s public land policy. The lessee has long been entitled to
compensation for permanent improvements. Wood recommended compensation
also for an increase in soil fertility and for unjustified disturbance.
Although the government still does not compensate for an increase in
soil fertility, it does give more consideration to paying compensation
for cultivation, clearing, summer fallowing, etc. at the expiration of
a lease. Recent legislation has clarified the lessee' s rights when
rights of way, pipelines, etc. disturb his quiet enjoyment of his lease. 16
As in Saskatchewan, Alberta farmers have not complained as much
about rental rates, insecurity of tenure, or compensation for improve
ments and freedom of operations as about insufficient capital for im
provements. In contrast to Saskatchewan, which extends cash grants per
acre to the lessee for putting land into cultivation, Alberta provided no
capital to its settlers until recently. However, rents may be forgiven
for the first three crop years of the lease. Mortgage payments do not
start until the fourth year when fewer than 25 acres are cultivated, the
third year when 25-50 acres are cultivated, and the second year when more
than 50 acres are cultivated. For every quarter section held, the Home
stead Lease farmer is obliged to break and seed to crop a minimum acreage
as follows :
Year
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ninth
Tenth

Acres to break

Acres to seed

10
10
10
10
0
0
10
10
0
0

0
10
20
JO
40
40
40
50
60
60

Cultivation Lease requirements are similar. Since most of the
public lands leased or sold require extensive improvements, the govern
ment' s land utilization requirements, along with the absence of capital,
have posed severe problems which the government has not yet satisfactor
ily solved. One suggestion for solving this problem is for the government

6wood, " Public Land Policy for Alberta," p. 160; V. A. Wood, Direc
tor of Lands, Province of Alberta (letter, 21 November 1968).
1
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to develop the land before selling it to farmers . Another is that the
land should be sold to large private investors who would develop the
land and resell to farmers . Both of these methods have been used in
Australia.
Wood reconnnended in 1953 that the Province guarantee loans for im
provements made through regular agencies like the Provincial Treasury
Board or the Dominion Government Farm Loan Board. To protect itself
the government would restrict the larger share of the loan to capital
improvements on the land its elf . Wood felt that the lessee should be
required to invest some of his own money since this gives him more
pride in his farm and work. In the past decade, Alberta has begun to
extend financial assistance to new settlers through loans with a leni
ent repayment plan at 4 . 5 percent interest. Two alternative methods
of government assistance suggested by Wood were a direct subsidy, as
in Saskatchewan, or government-created, permanent improvements to be
rented or sold on easy terms to the lessee. Wood shied away from the
latter because it smacks of government paternalism. While he argued
that the settler needed capital assistance , Wood believed that too much
government help would stifle initiative. 17
One of Wood ' s ideas that has been partially adopted was that resi
dence rules should be eased. These rules required the settler to
establish residence the first year and to live ther9 for six months
of each year thereafter. Wood argued that since most lessees must work
away from the farm to obtain sufficient capital for the initial im
provements , no residence should be required the first two years and
only three months in the third year . The 1966 Public Land Law merely
requires three months residence a year for a homesteader who is pur
chasing his land . 18
Wood and others have recognized that the government must provide
not only land improvement a s sistance but also more roads and social
services to enhance the attractiveness of life in frontier regions . 19
l7

Province of Alberta, An Act Respecting Public Lands, 1966 , pp.
24, 29 , 3 0 ; Wood, " Public Land Policy for Alberta , " p. 160 ; Wood
( letter , 21 November 1968 ) .
1

8wood,

19

" Public Land Policy for Alberta , " p. 189.

T . W. Manning, Chairman, Department of Agricultural Economi c s ,
University of Alberta ( letter, 15 August 1968 ) ; Wood, " Public Land
Policy for Alberta , " p. 163.
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The Province has never seriously interfered with the farmer ' s
freedom of operation, except in the most extreme cases of abuse . Al
though the various public land acts demand good farming practice s ,
enforcement i s the responsibility of overworked district agricultur
alists under the Department of Agriculture , who have been unable to
give sufficient attention to it apart from other duties . Wood be
lieved that when necessary, the government should use its police powers
to prevent freeholders from causing soil deterioration. He noted that
the Provincial government had little statutory authority over land
owners and hoped for the enactment of more legislation like the Noxious
Weeds Act. He also hoped that the government would specify in its
leases the use to be made of the land. Wood conceded, however, that the
popular belief in the sanctity of private property probably precluded
the acceptance of his recommendations . He suggested that the same end
might be achieved by providing farmers with more technical advice and
by taxing land on the basis of its productivity. Although Wood ' s
suggestions have not been implemented, the Province has attacked the
problem from another angle by screening applicants for public lands.
In some areas in recent years it has established boards composed of
representatives of the Department of Lands and prominent farmers , to
review and make recommendations on applications for public lands. 20
To conclude --Alberta ' s land disposal policies for intensive agri
culture are probably the most pertinent to the situation in the United
States . Although the Province has leased its public lands, its basic
goal has been fee simple ownership.
Grazing Leases
Although grazing leases are not the primary purpose of this study,
a note on the leasing policy for grazing lands in Alberta and Saskat
chewan may be of interest. In neither Province has there ever been any
real controversy over public ownership. While Canadians strongly ap
prove private ownership of farms , they agree on public ownership of
range land.

20

Province of Alberta , An Act Respecting Public Lands , 1966 , pp.
15-16 ; Wood, " Public Land Policy for Alberta , " pp. 72, 146, 153 ; Wood,
"Alberta ' s Land Policy , " Journal of Farm Economics , pp. 747-48 ; Wood
( letter, 21 November 1968) .
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In Alberta, rental rates have been the main source of contention
over the years. In the 19J0s and early 1940s the rent was based on
a flat rate per acre. Ranchers objected to this system because of the
low cattle and sheep prices �nd the droughts of the thirtie s . In 1945
the government adopted a flexible cash rent that was proposed by Al
berta stockgrowers . Under the new method the rent per acre is "one
tenth of the annual rate of gain of cattle on grass in pounds of beef
per head, multiplied by the weighted average price of all classes of
cattle
on the Calgary market
in the preceding year , divided
by the number of acres re quired to carry a mature head of cattle on the
range for twelve months . 11 21 Ironically, the plan raised rents rather
than lowering them because it was introduced during the postwar era of
rising price s . Saskatchewan has since adopted this plan.
•

•

•

•

•

•

Ranchers have been encouraged to practice sound conservation
principles . They may not carry as many cattle under the new as they
did under the old rate schedule , but the cattle and the range are
maintained in better condition. Despite the higher rentals the ranch
ers are generally satisfied.
Lands are generally leased for grazing for a term of 20 years in
Alberta and 21 years in Saskatchewan. The lease is renewable and
assignable by the lessee. He is entitled to compensation for improve
ments , although here again the real difficulty is a �ack of capital.
Wood wanted the government to provide limited financial assistance to
encourage range development and improvements such as reseeding, develop
ing water supplies , and eradicating bush and poisonous weeds. He also
favored range management plans worked out by ranchers and government
experts. 22
21
v . A. Wood and J . A. Campbell , "A Range Land Rental System Based
on Grazing Capacity and the Price of Beef , " Journal of Range Manage
ment 4 (November 1951) , pp. 370-4.
22
wood, "Public Land Policy for Alberta , " p. 171 ; Province of
Alberta , An Act Respecting Public Land s , 196 6 , pp. 15-16 .

II .

AUSTRALIAN LAND POLICIES
Intensive Agriculture

A discussion of Australian public land policy i s complicated be
cause it includes the policies of the six separate £tates that hold most
of the public lands . The Commonwealth government is directly responsi
ble only for the Northern Territory and therefore , a wide variety of
land policies and legislation exists , Nevertheles s , some general char
acteristics of Australian land policy are discernible. There is much
more public than private land , and most of the public lands are used
for grazing under a lease, The tenure status of Australian lands is
shown in the following table :
Private and public ownership of lands in Australia ,
by States and Territory , 1964

Government

Total acres
(millions)

New South Wales
Victoria
Queensland
South Australia
Western Australia
Northern Territory
Ta smania
Australia

198
56
427
243
625
333
17
1900

Private lands
Public lands
Alienated
In process
Leased
Other
------------------percent- ------------JO

4
4
1

57
6
7
5

(*)

39
9

1
2

(*)

2

(*)

57
11
87
60

40

58
9
56

9
28
6
33
53
42
51
33

Source : Australian Bureau of Census , Yearbook , no. 52 ( 1966 ) , as
presented by Campbell, Agriculture in the Australian Econozgy, p. 172.
*Less than 1 . 0 percent.
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As in the United States and Canada , Australia has generally free
holded its land for intensive agriculture , although some States have
pref erred to lease in order to resume land for closer settlement . The
State of Queensland and the Commonwealth in the Northern Territory have
preferred leasing. But in re cent years , even these areas have turned
to freeholding .
Special Commonwealth investigating commissions have recommended
the freehold over the leasehold. In 1944, the Rural Reconstruction
Commission, which studied the prospects for Australian agriculture
after World War II , reported that "land ownership implies a freedom
from interference, a continuity of existence on one property, " and
noted the social prestige that land ownership conferred. In 1959 the
Commission to Inquire into the Prospects for Agriculture in the North
ern Territory recommended that the Commonwealth permit freeholds there.
It declared that even a perpetual lease did not provide secure tenure
since some of the land could be resumed for closer settlement.
The perpetual lease has been recently def ended by Campbell who
pointed out that it requires no initial capital investment and that it
provides secure tenure which eases the obtaining of production loans
and encourages improvement and good farming practices. Like Wood in
Alberta, he argued that the perpetual lease is often superior to the
freehold. But in Australia , as in Alberta , the popularity of the free
hold seems too strong to resist. 23
At present, the major is sue in Australian land policy is the con
cept of the. home maintenance area" which has been written into land
legislation of every State. The home maintenance area is generally
defined a s , "an area which when used for the purpose for which it is
reas onably fitted would be sufficient for the maintenance in average
23
Keith Campbell, "Land Policy , " Agriculture in the Australian
Econorgy, ed. D. B. Williams ( Sydney : Sydney Univers ity Press , 1967 ) ,
p. 17 2 ; A . C . Lloyd , "The Economic Size of Farms , " Journal of the
Australian Institute of Agricultural Science 2 7 ( September 1961')"";" p.
140 ; Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Territories , Committee
to Inquire into the Prospects of Agriculture in the Northern Territory,
Prospects of Agriculture in the Northern Territory ( Canberra : Queen ' s
Printer, 1959) , p. 156. Hereafter cited as " Committee on the Northern
Territory'' ; Keith Campbell, " Current Issues in Australian Agriculture , "
delivered as the G . L . Wood Memorial Lecture at the University of
Melbourne on 26 August 1966.

seasons and circumstances of the average family . " This concept dates
from the turn of the century and has been used to encourage the family
farm under both freeholding and leasing.
Since World War II the interpretation of the home maintenance
area concept has been sharply criticized by economist s . As Australia
has become even more conscious of agriculture as the basis of its
econonzy-, it has tended to emphasize economic factors at the expense
Critics of the home maintenance area con
of social considerations .
cept stress that modern technology has expanded the area that may be
farmed adequately. They also argue that a static formula based on an
" average year" founders on wide fluctuations in annual rainfall or
farm prices . While few want the home maintenance area abolished, most
urge its revision so that it will work to expand , rather than to con
tract, farm size. 24
On Australian lands, complaints about rents have not been a signi
ficant problem. Political pres sure , as in Canada and the United State s ,
tends to cause land t o be undervalued for assessment. A typical rental
rate is 2 . 5 percent of the assessed value of the land. Lessees often
sell their leases before their terms expire and often realize handsome
profits because purchasers are willing to pay for the difference be
tween the government ' s low rental rate and the rental value of the land
in the market place.
Current criticism of rental policy does not come from settlers but
from economists anxious that the government earn a fair return from its
property. Campbell believes that the lessee should not profit from the
government ' s low rent when selling his leas e , and MacPhillamey wants
more fre quent valuations so that rents will keep pace with rising
values . 2 5
There has been s ome objection that any lease short of a per
petual lease or purchase lease does not provide secure tenure . Queens
land and the Northern Territory have traditionally limited their leases
24

campbell, Agriculture in the Australian Econosy, p. 174 ; Samuel
Wadham, Australian Farming, 1788-� (Melbourne : F . W. Cheshire,
1967 ) , p. 46; J. N. Lewis , "Is the Concept of the Home Maintenance Area
Outmoded? " Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics 7 (December
1963 ) , p . 104.
�
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campbell, Agriculture in the Australian Econosy, p. 175 ; Committee
on the Northern Territory, p. 15b;C . H. MacPhillamey , "Factors Affecting
Rural Land Prices in N . S .W. and the Construction of Indexes of Rural
Land Value s , " Australian Journal of Agricultural Economic s 8 (December
1964) , p. 153.
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to 25 to 40-year periods in order to regain land for closer settlement .
Campbell and Gruen argue that this policy is anachronistic since the
shorter term provides relatively little incentive for capital invest
ment in an age when such investment has become especially important .
In recent years Australia has endeavored to provide more security
of tenure . In 1952 Queensland alleviated some of the lessee ' s uncer
tainty by allowing hilll , if his term had more than seven years to run,
to retain a home maintenance area when the lease is terminated for
subdivision into smaller units for closer settlement.
New South Wales in 1966 relinquished its right to repo s se s s land
for closer settlement on a large number of estate s . And the Northern
Territory has allowed its leases to be renewed for a full term before
repossessing the land. Presently, most Australian leases for intensive
agriculture are perpetual with provision for freeholding after the
pattern set
the Commonwealth in the War Service Settlement Scheme
in the 1940s . 6

b�

Freedom to illlprove is currently not a problem since in most
Australian States the lessee receives compensation for permanent
improvements. Instead, lack of sufficient capital for improvements
is the prevailing source of discontent . By 1967 standards it is
e stimated that £ 40 , 000 are needed to buy a grain farm and equip it
with machinery and livestock. Critics have generally recommended
adjustments , but no major changes have been made by present credit
agencies , which include trading banks and pastoral finance companies.
To permit farmers to adopt scientific technology, more credit is
needed. But the Committee to Inquire into the Prospects of Agriculture
in the Northern Territory recommended that the government should avoid
as much as possible the extension of direct credit to the farmer . It
should also be noted that one reason the States have turned to the free
hold lies in the inability of leaseholders to obtain capital because
they cannot o£fer freeholds as security.
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campbell , " Current Issues in Australian Agriculture , " p. 7 ; F . H .
Gruen, "Capital Formation in Australian Agriculture , " Australian
J ournal of Agricultural Economics I (February 1957) , p. 102; T . H.
Strong, "Land Tenure in Australia i n Relation to Technical Advances
and Closer Settlement, " Journal of Farm Economics 38 (May 1956) , p. 463 ;
Campbell, Agriculture in the Australian Economy, p. 177 ; Committee on
the Northern Territory, p. 154.
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The State governments , however, compound the capital problem by
requiring lessees to develop their land rapidly. Western Australia,
for example , requires the holder of a conditional purchase lease to
clear and pasture 1000 acres of a 2500 -acre farm in a five -year period.
Moncrieff showed that only farmers with an initial capital of $25 , 000
could comply with thi s requirement and still achieve the maximum re
turn. Below the $25 , 000 level they would have to use less seed and
fertilizer with a corresponding reduction in net prdfit. 27
Since World War II Australia has experimented with three possible
s olutions to the farmer ' s capital conundrums : (1) the War Service Land
Settlement Scheme , ( 2) State government development pro jects , and ( 3 )
private development by land investment compani e s . Under the first
approach, the States improved the land, often ere cting structural im
provements . Even after the basic developmental phase , the States
granted the settler a living allowance until the land was brought up
to standard. Although tne value of the improvements was added to the
settler ' s rent or purchase price, the government never recovered its
full investment in land or development. The program was regarded as
successful, but it is doubtful that it could be revived today because
it rested on the non- economic objective of rewarding veterans , while
today' s objectives are more strictly economic.
Although the veterans ' demand for land has abated, some State
governments have continued development programs now open to all settlers .
The Conunonwealth government has continued to provide financial assis
tance . There are several current governmental projects for intensive
agriculture. One is the Brigalow Land Development Scheme in Queensland
in which farms are being made available for cereal and wheat production
and stockgrowing. Another is the Coleambally Irrigation Area project
in New South Wales where 1000 new farms are being planned to produce
fruit and vegetables along with cereals and wheat. There are also two
projects in Western Australia--one in the Oral River valley where the
feasibility of irrigated crops of cotton, sorghum and safflower is being
inve stigated and one in the Esperance area in the Southwe st which is
devoted to stock raising and cereal growing. Because the world market
price for beef is much more favorable than for wheat and cereal crops ,
Australia hesitates to undertake additional projects . The land is made
available in a variety of leases and purchase agreements , but all the

27

I . J . Moncrieff, "The Land Act and Farm Development , " Farm
Policy 3 ( September 1963) , p. 47; I . J . Moncrieff and R. G. Maulden,
" The Effect of Land Clearing Regulations on the Rate of Farm Develop
ment- -A Case Study, " Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics 7
(December 1963 ) , p. 176.
�

49

lands devoted to intensive agriculture can eventually be freeholded.
Unlike the Connnonwealth ' s War Service Land Settlement Scheme , the
State governments do not give special subsidies. Rather these State
plans tend to impose minimum capital requirements .
In addition to public land development , Australia has also experi
mented with private programs , which so far have not proved very success
ful. This approach still suffers from the failure of the Esperance
S cheme in Western Australia in the 1950 ' s . There the State gave a syn
dicate of Australian and American investors an option on 1 , 500 , 000
acres at 45 cents an acre. The syndicate was to develop the land and
sell to settlers at a price allowing for a fair return on the invest
ment. The program collapsed, however, because in its haste for quick
profits , the company developed the land too rapidly. In 1959 the State
withdrew the syndicate ' s option and began to dispose of the land itself .
In 1960 Western Australia signed a contract with another private
group which agreed to spend $4 , 60 0 , 000 to develop 1 , 50 0 , 000 acres by
1974. As of 1967, the plan was working successfully. Campbell hope s
that better use can be made of private development companies because
capital is short at resent, and the se companies provide access to
American inve stors. 2

�

Farmers have a high degree of freedom of operation in Australia.
The government does not strictly enforce its right to exact sound farm
practices from its lessee s , although it does demand removal of vermin
and noxious weeds. And here , as in Canada and New Zealand, experts
such as Campbell want the government to supervise more closely free
holders as well as leaseholder s , but because farmers have more votes
than agricultural economi st s , it is doubtful if these recommendations
will have any more effect than similar suggestions by Wood in Alberta. 29
In conclusion--it appears that in the future , credit facilities for
farmers will continue to be less than ideal, and that while the States
will continue to develop land, private companies will become more impor
tant. Farmers who have , or can obtain, capital needed for development
28

T . P. Field, Post-War Land Settlement in Western Australia ( Lex
ington, Kentucky:
University--of"""Kentucky Press, 1963), pp. 11, 12 , 43 ;
S . F . Harris , Director, Bureau of Agricultural Economi c s , Connnonwealth
of Australia ( letter , 21 August 1968) ; Campbell, Agriculture in the
Australian Econonzy-, p. 181 ; Campbell, "Current Is sues in Australian
Land Policy," p. 7.
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campbell , Agriculture in the Australian Economy, p. 183 ; Commit
tee on the Northern Territory, p. 155 .
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will be most likely to se cure land. Also , because present limits on
farm size prevent a desirable income level for the farm family, it
seems safe to predict that size limitations will be revised upward.
Individual States
'

Because there is some variation in land policy among the various
States , it seems best to discuss a representative group, including
Queensland, the Northern Territory, Western Australia , and New South
Wales .
Queensland
Queensland, alone among the Australian State s , has a tradition of
favoring the leasehold over the freehold and resuming land for closer
settlement. Of its 427 million acres only 6 percent are alienated,
and 87 percent are leased. Except for a three-year period, the State
sold no Crown land between 1916 and 1957. It disposed of lands for
intensive agriculture by perpetual lease. In 1957, however , in order
to attract more investment, it began to sell land again and permitted
the conversion of perpetual leases to the freehold. It has continued
to liberalize its laws , even permitting the conversion of grazing
leases.
At present there are three major methods of obtaining land for
intensive agriculture in Queensland. The two most prevalent are free
holding and perpetual lease . Under both tenure s a settler may acquire
usually no more than 2500 acres although he can obtain up to 5000 acres
if he is willing to spend at least 10 dollars an acre on land improve
ment. The selling price of public land, whether purchased outright or
secured by conversion of a perpetual lease , is based on the unimproved
value of the land. The price set is to be paid in annual installments
without interest. Both freehold and �erpetual lease tenures have resi
dence requirements . Rents for perpetual leases are 2 . 5 percent of the
capital value of the land, and the rents are reviewed every 10 years .
A third tenure i s the Settlement Farm Lease, which is designed for
semi-arable lands used for mixed farming and grazing. It obligates the
lessee to cultivate a specified area within a specified time. Its term
is 3 0 years with the rental review�d every 10 years. The lessee must
observe residence requirements and may convert the lease to a freehold.
At present the most favored agricultural areas have been free
holded. Very little land remains for intensive agriculture because
Queensland prefers to develop potentially arable land for stockgrowing
in view of the current world market price s . In general , there seems
51

to be little dis satisfaction with Queensland's land policy , although
there has been some criticism of the government's policy regarding
compensation for improvements . While the government pays for struc
tural improvements, it does not compensate the lessee for the clearing
costs which in more primitive areas are quite high. Critics have
charged that this lack of compensation retards development. 30
The Northern Territory
The Northern Territory is the most arid region of Australia and
grants very little land for intensive agriculture. Less than 1 per
cent of its 333 million acres is alienated or private land. Virtually
all of its occupied land is held on lease. Of these 140 , 000 , 000 lease
hold acres , only 143 , 000 are held on agricultural lease s , and much of
this land is held under a mixed farming-grazing lease. Agricultural
leases are perpetual with a review of the rental every 10 year s , al
though there is a ceiling beyond which the rent may not be raised .
The lessee is obliged to fulfill a residence requirement.
The Commonwealth has tried to stimulate the development of the
Northern Territory's unpromising land for intensive agriculture. It
remits the lessee's rent for the first 21 years or his lifetime,
whichever is shorter . In 1956 it introduced the Agricultural Develop
ment Lease which appeals to private development companies. The devel
oper's term may not exceed 30 years , and he must subdivide all or part
of his land for agricultural leases . He is , however , entitled to
compensation for improvements . The Committee to Inquire into the
Prospects for the Development of Agriculture in the Northern Territory
recommended shifting from the perpetual lease to freeholding in order
to attract new capital for agricultural development and to provide
security for settlers seeking loan s . The Commonwealth now permits land
to be freeholded, subject to restrictions, some of which are uncommonly
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Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics , Queensland Office,
Queensland Yearbook , 1966 ( Brisbane : Queen's Printer , 1966) , p. 139 ;
V . B. Sullivan, Digest of the Land Laws of Queensland ( Brisbane : Queen's
Printer, 1968) , pp. 1-13; W. A. T. Summerville , " Settling Brigalow
Lands , " Queensland Agricultural Journal 88 ( December 1962) , p . 705; W.
Bott, " Plough Moves into the Goondivindi District , " gueensland Agri
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52

rigid. It forbids selling land to an incorporated company and
the maximum area one person may hold to 20 ,480 acre s . It also
permit the new owner to transfer or sometimes even to mortgage
without official consent, and it limits the purchase period to
than 20 years .

limits
does not
his land
no more

Freedom of operation is the rule in the Northern Territory, al
'
though the Committee recommended that the government make more use of
its power to enforce good farming practice. 31
Western Australia
Western Australia has a strong freehold tradition. Under its
1893 Homestead Act, it granted 160 acres free to settlers . The pro
vision remains in the current Land Act, passed originally in 1933 , al
though it is a dead letter since the best land has long since been
taken. The major lease for intensive agriculture is the Conditional
Pur chase Lease. Purchase payments are spread over 25 to JO years and
extensions are permitted. A Conditional Purchase Lease is limited to
5000 acres. The State ordinarily requires the lessee to develop half
of the land within 11 years .
In Western Australia , as elsewhere , the trend since World War II
has been toward making ownership easier. In 1951 the State allowed
war veterans , who were holding perpetual leases under the War Service
Land Settlement Scheme , to purchase in fee simple after 10 years. In
1960 it amended this to permit freeholding in less than 10 year s . 32
New South Wales
--

---

In its early years New South Wale s ' land policy oscillated between
the perpetual lease and the freehold. The freehold system is currently
dominant although the State grants farm lands on perpetual leases with
the right to convert to the freehold. The land legislation is compli
cated by the fact that the State does not administer all of its lands .
Jl

Committee on the Northern Territory, pp. 151-7 ; Commonwealth
Department of the Interior, "Land for Settlement in the Northern Ter
ritory , " unpublished manus cript (February 1968) , pp. 1, 7 .
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The grazing lands in the western part of the State are administered
by the Western Lands Commission and those in irrigation areas by the
Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission.
Public land leases in New South Wales are held under the Agri
cultural Holdings Act of 1941 which governs both private and public
leases . The Act was based on England' s Agricultural Holdings Act of
1923 and is , by far, Australia ' s most ambitious attempt to protect
the tenant. While earlier laws granted the tenant fixity of tenure ,
freedom to improve , and freedom t o operate , they also allowed him to
renounce those rights . Many landlords required the tenant to relin
quish these rights, especially compensation for improvements . The
1941 Act forbids the tenant to contract away these rights. The New
South Wales Agriculture Holdings Act also protects the tenant ' s right
to compensation for such items as hay and straw stored on the farm at
the end of the lease , to any increased value of the holding resulting
from a higher standard of farming than required, and for disturbance
of tenure. If the landlord effects improvements himself , he may not
charge the tenant an annual rent of more than 5 percent of his cost.
The law also protects the landlord from the cost of unnecessary im
provements made by the tenant. The tenant may practice any form of
cropping he desires and cannot waive this right. However, the land
lord is entitled to compensation if the tenant injures his land.33
Campbell notes that, despite its scope , the Act has fallen some
what short of expectations :
is that both the provisions covering
The chief defect
payment of compensation to tenants and those requiring ade
quate notice to quit have generally proved ineffective in the
case of verbal agreements. This is because the Act conflicts
with the seventeenth century English Statute of Frauds which
applies equally in Australian law and which provides that any
agreement not performed within one year must be in writing if
it is to be enforceable . Unfortunately, verbal agreements are
rather prevalent, and landlords themselves are disposed to
avoid written contracts under present circumstances . There
is also mounting agitation by landlords for amendment of the
Act on the ground that the legislation as it now stands
makes it excessively difficult to dismi�s inefficient and
incompetent tenants and share farmers . 34
•

•

•

33A . W. S. Moodie , "Farm Tenancy in New South Wales--The Agri
cultural Holdings Act, 1941, and its Application, "
ricultural Gazette
of New South Wales 54 ( 1943 ) , pp. 206 , 209, 261, 2 , 266, 308 .
34Campbell, Agriculture in the Australian Econoszr, pp. 176 -7.
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Grazing Leases
While Australians prefer freeholds for intensive agriculture, they
prefer leaseholds for grazing lands. The Committee to Inquire into the
Prospects for Agriculture in the Northern Territory expressed the pre
vailing view when it recommended retaining the leasehold on pastoral
land for the immediate future to prevent overgrazing ' and other mal
practices and to protect the State from selling land at very low prices.
A variety of tenures is used for disposing of Crown lands for
grazing as illustrated by the land law of Queensland. The State em
ploys the Pastoral Lease in the remote areas where more than 45 , 000
acres are needed for a living area. The term is generally no longer
than 30 years with rent adjustments at 10-year intervals. The State
also grants a Pastoral Development Lease where costly improvements are
needed to improve carrying capacity and productivity. The Pastoral
Lease and Pastoral Development Lease are the only two without limita
tions on the amount of land that can be held without prohibitions
against corporation farming and without residence requirements. They
are, however, the only two leases in which the State retains the right
to resume a portion of the land before expiration, a right that may be
exercised over as much as one-third of the land after 15 years.
Two other popular holdings are the Preferential Pastoral Holding
Lease and the Grazing Homestead Lease. Both are designed for more
closely settled areas. The Preferential Pastoral Holding Lease is
generally granted for land on the fringe of closely settled areas or
for poorer quality Crown Land within these areas. The maximum area
that may be held under this tenure is ordinarily 60 , 000 acres. The
Grazing Homestead Lease is limited to a maxi.mum of 45 , 000 acres al
though this ceiling can be raised to 60 , 000 acres. Both leases exclude
corporations and impose residence requirements. Grazing leases also
often require that livestock be limited to reasonable carrying capac
ity. However, both leases provide considerable security of tenure in
that the government may not resume land before expiration of the lease
term.
In all of its leases Queensland has made an effort to mitigate
the tenant ' s uncertainty near the end of his tenure . It permits him
to surrender his land at any time within the last 10 years of his term
for a new lease. Although the lessee often must relinquish some land
for closer settlement in the new lease, he has the advantage of a more
secure tenure in the remaining area.
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Queensland ' s leasing policy for grazing lands is typical of that
of the other Australian States. In the even more sparsely developed
States of South and Western Australia, however, grazing leases run for
still longer periods--up to 99 years . The ranches are much larger--a
ranch of 75 , 000 acres is considered a small grazing unit. Some stations
may include as much as 420 , 000 acres . Annual rentals average $ 2 . 25 per
square mile. Australian graziers seem well satisfied with their condi
tions . An American visitor in 1958 observed that most of the operators
were well educated and efficient. As a result, they enjoyed a high
standard of living despite their remote locations. He concluded that
these lessees enjoyed "an unusual security of tenur e . " In the light of
the waning enthusiasm for closer settlement and smaller living areas ,
it appears that Australian ranchers will become even more secure in the
foreseeable future. 35
35

sullivan, pp. 1-13 ; Royale K . Pierson, " Public Land Grazing
Down Under , " Our Public Lands 7 ( April 1958 ) , pp. 4-5, 12-14.

III .
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intens ive
on cattle
to cereal

NEW ZEALAND LAND POLICIES

of New Zealand ' s public land policies are not relevant to
agriculture since its agricultural economy is based primarily
and sheep grazing . As of 1963 , it devoted only 406 , 000 acres
production and 813 , 000 acres to grain, root, and other crops .
I

Of New Zealand ' s 40 million acres of occupied land, 22 million
acres are privately held while 18 million acres, or 45 percent, are
public lands belonging to the Crown. Of the 18 million acre s , 2 . 6
million acres are held under 5 , 000 Renewable Farm Leases and 0 . 5 million
acres under 1400 deferred payment farm licens e s . The Renewable Farm
Lease is used to dispose �f cropland and can be converted to a freehold.
Cropland is also sold for cash or deferred payments . The typical farm
lease runs for JJ years and may be renewed. The basic land law, the
Land Act of 1948 , specified that rentals shall be 4 . 5 percent and
deferred freehold payments 4 . 62 percent per year. However, in 1956
both rates were eliminated, and charges are left to the discretion of
the Land Settlement Board.
The history of New Zealand ' s public land policies is similar to
that of other nineteenth century frontier regions such as Canada ,
Australia, and the United States in that it originally stressed sell
ing the land to encourage private settlement . In 1894, however , with
the Liberal-Labor Party in power, the government be came more discrim
inating in its land grants and also began to resume land from the large
private estates for closer settlement , a policy which is still con
tinued. The Liberal-Labor government also favored the perpetual lease
over freeholding. But the fee simple tradition was so strong that the
government granted no more perpetual leases after 1907 . However , some
6000 granted before 1907 still exist today. The pres sure of the small
farmers continued, and in 1912 the Reform Party returned to power to
extend the right to freehold Crown lease s . Since 1912 the trend to
ward freeholding has continued uninterrupted to the present time and
meets with general approva1 . J 6
36

Horace Belshaw, "Land Tenure and the Problem of Tenurial Reform
in New Zealand , " Family Farm Policy, ed. Joseph Ackerman and Marshall
Harris ( Chicago: University of Chicago Pre s s , 1947 ) , pp. 175-80 ; New
Zealand Department of Statisti c s , New Zealand Official Yearbook (Well
ington : Government Printer , 1964) , pp. 286, 288 ; R. J . MacLachlan,
"Land Administration in New Zealand , " address read before the 196 7
Conference of the New Zealand Institute of Valuers , pp. 9-11.
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During the 1960s farmers charged the government with placing ex
cessive valuations on its land, to which the government responded b
y
appointing a special investigating committee that reported in 1968 . J?
The Committee recommended several changes for Crown lands. Noting
that the 33 -year lease in a · period of rising land values unfairly
discriminated against the Crown, it suggested that charges be reviewed
every 11 years . To soften the effect of this change, it suggested
that the Crown charge 0 . 5 percent less than the prevailing interest
rate.
The 1968 Committee recommended that perpetual leases be converted
into freeholds although it did not specify how this should be done.
The Committee also recommended instituting a purchase lease, already
in use in some Australian State s . This purcha se lease requires no
deposit but calls for an annual fee which includes the purchase price
and rent. The Committee hoped that this leas e , which is similar to a
long-term mortgage, would meet the needs of settlers for greater
security of tenure. 3 8
The 1968 Committee also suggested changes in the government ' s
fees for converting a lease into a freehold. At present the govern
ment does not credit a lessee with the market value of his low rental
lea s e . This low rental during a period of rising land values consti
tutes an asset which the lessee can realize by selling the lease. Al
though earlier land laws recognized this as the lessee ' s asset when
calculating the freeholding charge , current legislation does not. The
1968 Committee recommended the amending of the Land Act of 1948 to
allow the lessee to deduct this asset from the purchase price if he
should convert to the freehold.
As noted earlie r , the 1968 Committee recommended that perpetual
leases be discontinued.
Since these leases--a ctually 99-year leases-
are relics of the 1894-1907 era when land values were Illll ch lower than
today, the rents charged are extremely low. Yet the Committee offered
no advice on how to induce these lessees to freehold, and it is doubt
ful that they will voluntarily give up their comfortable situation
without substantial inducement.
3?

Report of the Committee of Investigation into Rentals and Free
holdings of Crown Leases (Wellington: Government Printer , 19b8J, p. 14.
Hereafter cited as 111968 Committee . "
38

Mac1achlan, p . 1 2 ; New Zealand Department of Statistics , pp. 286,
288 ; 1968 Committee, pp. 16 , 18 .
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It should also be noted that, unlike the Canadian Province of
Saskatchewan, New Zealand makes no provision for reducing rents in
the event of a crop failure or low price s , However , New Zealand' s
climate is stable enough so that crop fluctuations are not a serious
problem. 39
Aside from fair rents there has not been much of a problem on the
public lands of New Zealand. Fixity of tenure is generally guaranteed
by the standard 33-year lease with the right to renew for another 33
year s . In some case s , generally for conservation reasons , the govern
ment reserves the right of renewal and limits the lease ' s length.
The Crown also permits the lessee the right to convert to the free
hold and the right to sell the lease. On this latter point, the Com
mittee ruefully noted that the great demand for land caused many set
tlers to lease land at rental rates equal to those being paid for free
holds and also to accept the added risk of increased rates at renewal
time . 40
Compensation for improvements is standard in Crown lease s . The
lessee may purcha se Crown improvements at any time (with the approval
of the Land Settlement Board) in cash or on a deferred payments basis .
The lessee is responsible for maintaining the government ' s improve
ments and must insure Crown property.
The 1968 Committee did find some confusion and dis content among
lessees with government owned improvements . Although these improve
ments are not always mentioned or clearly defined in the lease , their
value is included in the rent. Under the 1948 Land Act the lessor is
entitled to the current value of his unexhausted improvements . The
government, therefore , has a problem in determining its unexhausted
improvements and in valuing them at current price s . Moreover, if the
lease changes hands , there is often considerable confusion over the
ownership of various improvements and also disagreement over the
amount of compensation to be paid. The 1968 Committee sided with the
lessee and recommended that the government sell the improvements at
their value to the lessee rather than at their current value. It
argued that although the Crown would lose the increased value , it
would at least s�ve the time and money spent trying to prove the value
of improvements . 1

39
40
p. 20 .
41

1968 Committee , pp. 15-16 ; Belshaw, Family Farm Policy, p. 201.
New Zealand Department of Statistics , p . 298 ; 1968 Committee,
1968 Committee , pp. 17-18.
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Historically, capital has been less of a problem for New Zealand
farmers on public land than for farmers in the Canadian Prairie Prov
ince s . The goverrunent ' s rural loan program dates back to 1894 and has
been improved steadily over the years . A milestone in its development
was the Marginal Lands Act of 1950 under which the government provides
advice and loans to farmers needing capital to develop marginal lands
but who lack sufficient security to borrow from normal lending in
stitutions .
The goverrunent itself has long maintained a program to develop
marginal lands . In the 1941-1966 period it developed 1 . 8 million
acres on which it settled 4, 160 individuals , J , 500 of whom were ex
servicemen . Of this land JO percent was owned by the Crown, 60 per
cent was private land acquired voluntarily for closer settlement and
10 percent was private land acquired under compulsion. The impetus
for public land development came from the veterans settlement program
which virtually ceased in the early sixties . But the government be
lieved that economic benefits justified continuing the program, and
the Crown is proceeding to develop another one million acres for at
least 1 , 500 settlers .
Since the goverrunent makes many improvements on the land, it
keeps control until it recovers the costs. It not only constructs
houses and other farm buildings , but it also seeds and fertilizes
gras slands. The government retains the land until the grazing capac
ity is firmly established , and meanwhile it markets the produce . In
the mid-sixties the Crown ' s revenue from its land development program
in a typical year was $ 6 . 2 million of which $4.8 million was derived
from the sale of farm products , and only $1.4 million from time pay
ments on land and improvements . The government relinquishes the land
only when it is convinced that the incoming farmer can make a living
from the start. The units granted vary from 500 t 800 acre s . Vir
tually all of this new land is devoted to grazing. 2

�

A popular method for settling ex-servicemen after World War II
was to employ them for wages on land being developed and to allot them
a section of this land when the development was completed. When the
emphasis shifted to settling civilians in the 1960s , the government
stressed financing the settler over and above his deposit of 10 per
cent of the total value of the land, improvement s , and stock.

42
C .A . Mcilroy , 11How the State ' s Land Development Program Meets
the Challenge of Change , 11 Service (New Plymouth, Summer 1966) , pp.
4-9.
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The Crown' s land development program is popular. A recent criti
cism has had nothing to say about improvements or capital availability
but has come from South Islanders who feel that th government has
�
slighted them in favor of developing North Island. 3
As in the other areas studied, the New Zealand government does
not interfere significantly with the lessees ' operations but has tried
to avoid this problem largely by screening out undes1rable applicants.
The 1968 Coilllllittee recommended that the government reject applicants
who are so heav44y indebted that they might not follow sound conserva
tion practices .
In sum, New Zealand has disposed of public land for intensive
agriculture for the past 60 years through the freehold, with leasing
a temporary expedient . Generally, the government ' s leasing policy has
been satisfactory. The main complaint has recently come from farmers
disturbed at the high evaluations of public lands, and this complaint
appears to be near a solution.
As for grazing lands, New Zealand--like Saskatchewan, Alberta,
Australia, and the United States--prefers to lease them. There are
two basic leases , the Pastoral Lease for 33 years with a right of the
renewal and a Pastoral Occupation License which runs for a term of up
to 21 years and carries neither a claim to the land itself nor the
right of renewal. Rentals for pastoral leases varied from $1-3 a
square mile at 1958 price s , but the lessee is ordinarily required to
make annual improvements such as fencing, water development, and tree
planting . The pastoral lessee is entitled to compensation for perma
nent improvements , but the holder of a Pastoral Occupation License has
no such claim unless the Land Settlement Board grants an exception or
unless the license is renewed. As of 1963 there were 448 Pastoral
Leases covering 6 . 8 million acres and .54 Pastoral Occupation Licenses
covering 0 . 5 million acre s . 45
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McLachlan, pp. 10 , 13 , 14; Department of Lands and Survey,
Annual Report, 1968 (Wellington : Government Printer, 1968) , p. 5 .

44McLachlan, p . 13 ; 1968 Coilllllit tee, p . 23 .
45

New Zealand Department of St�tistics , pp. 98 , JOO ; Pierson,
" Public Land Grazing Down Under , " pp. 4-5 , 12-14.
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IV.

LAND DISPOSAL POLICIES IN THE NETHERLANDS

The only goverrunent studied which stre sses leasing rather than
selling public lands for intensive agriculture is the Netherlands .
Virtually all of its public lands consists of " polders" that have
been reclaimed from the North Sea at great cost. Because of this
cost the government seeks to realize the greatest possible return on
its investment . Apparently it believes this can be mo
readily
achieved by leasing than by selling the land outright.

�

When completed in the 19 7 0s the polders will yield 500 , 000 acres
of additional farm land to a nation which now possesses only five mil
lion acres . Because Netherlanders farm very intensely, the individual
plots on the polders are limited to between 30 and 120 acres , with 7 0
percent consisting of 60 acres or les s . As in the other States
studied, the Netherlands has attempted to define an adequate farm size
for leasing the redistributing land. Presently, there are two schools
One advocates a size of 15 to 25 acres
of thought on the subject.
which will allow an individual farmer "to utilize his entire capacity
for work in a rational way . " The other faction favors about 3 5-3 8
acres to provide sufficient work for two men. It as sumes that the
farmer will be aided by his sons. Both methods have been applied by
local boards under the Land Consolidation Act of 1954. In general,
the smaller farms are for market gardening while the larger farms are
livestock or dairy farms . 47
Since the Netherlands has no crop share leases , even under pri
vate leasing, all rents are payable in cash; however, the rents are
low. Because of the tremendous demand for land since World War II ,
the government has felt it necessary to hold down all land rents by
rent controls . The rents charged are based on soil productivity and
also on the value of Crown improvement s , which are quite extensive .
46
Public Relations and Information Department of the Netherlands
Ministry of T ransportation and Waterstaat , From Fisherman ' s Paradise
to Farmer ' s Pride (The Hague : Netherlands Information Service , 1959) ,
p . 52 .

47
Franklin J . Reis s , "New Lands" unpublished and undated paper,
Agricultural Economics Department , University of Illinois, (written
since 1958 ) ; Ministry of Transportation and Waterstaat, From Fisher
man ' s Paradise to Farmer ' s Pride, p. 48 ; S . Herweyer, "The Reclamation
of , Distribution of, and Settlement in New Cultivatable Land 11 Nether
1
lands Journal of Agricultural S cience 5 ( August 1957) , p. 17u .
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The government not only re claimed the land but al so constructed the
farm houses . Rents range from £ 80 an acre-year for sandy and peat
soil to .£ 165 an acre -year in the heavy loam soil zone. Rents may be
reviewed every three year s , but there is no adjustment for changes in
commodity price s . The tenant may appeal the lessor ' s decision to the
local Land Chamber whose rulings may in turn be appealed to the Central
Land Chamber. 48
A lack of capital, which handicaps lessees in the other countries
included in this study, is not a severe problem in the Netherlands .
Since there is a tremendous demand for polder land, the government sets
up rigid requirements for tenants , including capital resource s . It
demands that the applicant have available £ 6407 acre or .£38 ,400 for
a 60 -acre plot ; 25 percent of the total must be the applicant ' s own
money, but up to 50 percent may be borrowed from relatives or others ,
and up to 25 percent may be in the form of loans from the local Farmers
Credit Bank with repayment guaranteed by the Central Farmers Credit
Bank.
The government employs additional criteria in selecting tenant s ;
since it is really establishing whole new communities on the reclaimed
land, it seeks a population balanced by age , religion, and provincial
origin. It also gives preference to applicants who are abandoning
uneconomic farm units or who have lost farms in the public interest,
for road construction, etc . 49
The land is leased for 12 year s , the nunimum period for land with
buildings under the Land Rent Act of 1958 that regulates public and
private leasing arrangement s . The lease i s automatically extended for
six-year periods unless either party gives notice . Netherlands law
allows the government to evict the tenant only for poor husbandry or
if land is to be used for a public purpose. The tenant' s heir suc
ceeds him, but he must meet certain requirements . Although the State
is considering leasing the land for longer terms , the present system
seems to guarantee the tenant reasonable security of tenure.
48
Reiss , " New Lands , " p . 4; Cornelius D . Scheer, "The Place of
Tenancy in the Agriculture of the Netherlands , " Land Tenure , eds .
Kenneth Parsons , Raymond J . Penn, and Philip M. Raup (Madison: Uni
versity of Wisconsin Pre s s , 1956) , pp. 520 -1 ; Foreign Information
Service, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisherie s , Agriculture in the
Netherlands ( The Hague : Government Publishing and Printing Office,
1962) , p. 52 ; Ministry of Transportation and Waterstaat, p. 48 .
49

Ministry of Transportation and Waterstaat, p. 54.
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The government owns the major improvements such as the farm house,
and is responsible for their basic maintenance. Under Netherlands law
the tenant is re sponsible for minor repairs and provides his own
machinery and livestock. A�l improvements are insured by their res
pective owners . Under the Land Act of 1958, the tenant receives reim
bursement for his improvements . Compensation may not exceed the ap
preciated or increased value of the farm. The amount of use the tenant
obtained from his improvements is deducted from his reimbursement.
Because the government owns the major improvements on the polders, no
great problem of compensation exists.
The State apparently does not impose any more rigid conditions on
farming practices than do most nations . It should be remembered that
the initial selection grocess almost always sifts reliable tenants from
a host of applicants . 5
In general , the government ' s leasing policies
are well received.
50
Ministry of Transportation and Waterstaat, p. 52 ; Scheer, The
Place of Tenancy, pp. 520 ff.
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V.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Leaseholds and freeholds are widely used methods of disposing of
public lands in Alberta and Saskatchewan, Canada , and in Australia , New
Zealand , and the Netherlands . The granting of freehold estates is the
trend for cropland ( except in the Netherlands where almost all public
land is leased) while leaseholds remain common for grazing lands. When
leaseholds are available for cropland, they are generally for long terms
or are perpetual leases . Since more status is attached to land owner
ship than to leasing, the freehold is the overwhelming choice of farm
ers , and in many of the Provinces and States the leasehold can be con
verted into a freehold. The provision for converting is a response to
the fact that farmers feel the need of security or fixity of tenure if
they are to be free to improve and to operate in a manner that benefits
both private and public interests .
The question of fair rents is a constant one, and there appears
to be no entirely satisfactory answer . Sale of the land to the farmer
is the most popular disposition method, but it too presents problems
of land valuation. Various methods of determining value are in use.
The sale by sealed bids or open auction is perhaps the least burden
some from an administrative standpoint . Its dangers are that through
ignorance of land values , over optimism, or desperation, the farmer may
bid more than can be paid for with the income of the farm.
Credit for improvements on both freeholds and leaseholds is also
a problem. The down payment on the freehold frequently absorbs capital
needed for improvements . The leasehold also has the disadvantage of
not being as good security as a freehold for improvement loans .
Farm size has been a major concern of settlers , and they have
agitated for increases in the acreage of public land grants . In recent
years most of the governments have raised the acreage limits to allow
units to become more economically adequate . In Alberta the maximum
land grant was increased from 320 to 800 acre s , and a similar revision
has been made in Sa skatchewan.
Whether to dispose of land by leasehold or freehold also involves
the basic question: can farmers be trusted, or induced, to handle the
land under a freehold so that both private and public interests are
better served than under a leasehold? Under the leasehold the State
can reserve control over land use by provisions in the lease; however,
whether this right to control can be effectively exercised is another
matter. The evidence that the State can prevent abuse of land by
lease provisions is not impressive .
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CHAPTER 8

L AN D P O L I C Y
K . 0 . CAMPBELL
University o f Sydney

Land policy loomed very large in public thinking and action in Australia
in its ea!·ly days. The colony of South Australia was in fact founded in 1 836
as a practical test of Edwanl Gibbon Wakefield's particular theory of land
settlernent.1 Jn the nineteenth century, revenue from land sales was for a long
time a major source of public revenue. Parliamentary elections were won or
lost on land policy issues.
Today, the administration of land is essentially concerned with canying

out settled policy. It is true that in some Australian States the platforms of
the political parties still reflect the beliefs of 50 years ago that subdi\'ision

of pre-existing holdings (closer settlement) is the major means of promoting
rural development. Hut as the public bec->111es more fully aware of the
poten tialities for agricultural expansion inherent in recent advances in agri·
cultural technology, it is likely that this older emphasis on land redistribu
tion as a means to development will be superseded.

The Australian Federal go\'ernment as such has no land policy, except i n

s o far a s i t i s directly in\'oh·cd iu the administration o f the i'\orthern Terri

tory and the overseas territories of Papua and New Guinea. Upon the federa
tion o[ the Australian States in 1 90 1 , the administration of land was one area

of public responsibility which was left i·.1 �he hands of the State go\'ernments.
All of these States at that time had lands departments as constituent parts
of their administrative machinery a·nd this situation still prevails today.

Despite i�s lack of constitutional authority, the Commonwealth govern·
ment can nevertheless exercise some indirect innt:ence upon the direction of

land policy. This arises mainly from the limited financial autonomy of the
States in recen t decades. The mark of the Commonwealth go\'ernment upon

land policy was most clearly seen with respect to the scheme for the settle
ment of ex·sen·icemen after 'Vorkl War II, which is discussed later. B u t the

Federal government exercises a more continuous influence in a financial con·
J. Ed ward Gibbon Wakefield, A Leiter from Sydney, London 1829, re p ublished by J. :'IL
Dent and Sons, London 1929. For an evaluation of the Wakefield doctrine sec R. C. Mills,
The Colo11is11 tio11 of A wt rnlia, 18:!9·/S./2, Sidgwick and Jackson, London 1915; and S. H.
Roberu, History of A wtrnlian I.And Settlemwt, :'\Iacmillan, Melbourne 192-!.

Austr�lian Econ�my� ed. D. B.
From Agriculture
by nermi ssion of
Austruia,
1�Villi 3Ills
Sidney University Press (price ,

(Sidney,
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$8 . 50) .

text. Loan funds used by th� States to finance closer settlement activities and
for other purposes arc reviewed aunually on a federal basis at the meeting of
the Loan Council, comprised of federal and State finance ministers. Major
schemes for land development are also subject to federal review, i f federal
finance is required, as i t usually is. Apart from its participation in land settle
ment activities, the Federal government levies land taxes and estate duties.
These were originally conceived as a means of discouraging the aggregation
of land into large holdings.2
LAND OWNERSHIP
Australia is probably unique among the western countries in that a high
proportion of its land is still in pu�lic ownership. Table 8-1 shows in absolute and relat i \'e terms the areas alienated and unalienated in the various
States in 1 964. These figu:·cs nc,w change very little from year to year. The

.Table 8-1
Ownership of Land, 1 964

Stale or

Territory

N.S.W.

Vic.

Qld.
S.A.

W.A.

Tas.
N.T.
A.C.T.
Australia
N.S.\<\T.

Vic.

Qld.
S.A.
W.A.
Tas.
N.T.
A.C.T.
Australia
a.

b.

Private lands
In process
Alienated
of
alienation
m . acres
m. acres

58 · 9
31 · 8
26 · 4
16·0
29 · l
6·6
0·3
O· l
169 · l

%

29 · 7
56 · 5
6·2
6·5
4·7
39 · l
O· l
10·6
8·9

7·l
2 ·4
3·8
0·4
14·5
0·2

_b

_b

28 · 5

%

3·6
4·2
0·9
0·2
2·3
l ·3
6·9
l ·5

Public lands
Ltased or
licensed
Other a
m.

acres

1 13·3
6· l
369 · 4
146 ·4
246 · 5
1 ·5
191 ·4
0·3
1,074 · 8

%

57 · 2
10·9
86 ·5
60 · 2
39·5
8·6
57 5
47 · 5
56 · 6

m.

acres

18·8
16·0
27 · 3
80 · 5
331 · 5
8·6
141 ·2
0·2
627 · 0

%

9·5
28 · 4
6·4
33 · l
53 · 5
51 ·0
42 · 4
35·0
33·0

Total
area
m.

acres

198 · 0
56 · 2
426 · 9
243 · 2
624 · 6
16·9
333 · 0
0·6
1 ,899 · 5

%

1 00 · 0
100 ·0
1 00 · 0
1 00 · 0
1 00 · 0
1 00 · 0
100·0
1 00 · 0
1 00 · 0

Land occupied by government agencies, reserved lands, and unoccupied lands.
Not significant.

SouRc.F. : Tear Book, No 52, 1 956, Bmeau of Census and Statistics.

2. J. M. C�rbnd, Economic A!pells of Australian I.And Ta'(a/ion, �fclbourne University
Press, Mclbo11mc 1934.
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i n teresting point is that 1 75 years after the first settlement only 1 0 · 4 per cent
o[ the total area o[ the country had been alienated or was in process of
alienation.
The aliena ted lands, for the most part, are located in the older settled
areas, Victoria being 1he only State with m ore than half of its lands in
private o'rncrship. The large acreages of land held under lease from the
government ;ire loc::acd predominantly in the more sparsely settled, more
arid pastoral areas of Queensland, "'estern Australia, the Northern Terri
tory, New South \\'ales and South Australia.
The various fonns of bnd tenure in the various States are broadly similar,
the similarity be:ing strongest among the eastern States which originally
formed part of !'\cw South \\'ales. Even so, the large number of types of

tenure and Yariety of terms and conditions applying to particular tenures
make it impossible to proYicle a S\jccinct outline of the country's land Jegis

Ja ti on. 3
FREEHOLD TENURES
There are two types of freehold tenure. The first, which applies to the greater
part of the alienated lands, al lows a high degree of freedom to the indi
vidual owner to use or to tr::insfe:r the land ::is he wishes. The government <loes
retain some control by virtue of the right of eminent domain, the right to
tax, and the right to institute land-use regulations in the n::imc of resource
conscrva ti on.

However, in the case of some of the freehold land acquired in the past 50

years or so, go,·crnmcnts have a ttached a caveat preventing their transfer to
persons who already hold more th:m a specified area of Janel. This is true, for
instance, of lands acquired under conditional purchase tenures and certain
other tenures in :\:cw South \V:ilcs after 1 909. In other words, some of the
restrictions which :ipply to lands in process of alien:ition, described in the
next section, ;ipply equally to some freehold land.
THE TEXURE OF Lr\:'\DS I� PROCESS O F ALIE�ATION
The State go,·ernmcnts typically place m a n y conditions upon landholders
who are in the procc�s of purcha�ing their Janel. Usually there is a limit set
on the area ,.; hich can be :icguircd, the concept of 'the home m:iinten;mce
area' or 'Ji, ing are::i' bein6 frcgucntly employed as ::in administrative device
i n this connc�iion. Sometimes, ::is with some tenu1es in l'\e\\· South '\'ales,
there arc, in addition, certain acreai;e maxima :ipplicable to particubr
regions. In most c:ises also. it is incumbent on the O\rner to Ji,·e on the
}. The m<'�t s�H<:matic aw:mpt t o pr<.>\'idc a n outline or :\11s1r.iliJn Lind kgislJtion was
macle by th e St1T\l'� Or·Gcncr:ll of \\'nt r rn Amtrali:l, :'-Ir W. \'. Fyfr, in J 9 l 4. This report
fo1mtd :\11nr\.11rc .\ of the Xi11th R.:port of the R 1 1 1 � l Rccom 1 1 11c1ion Commission, Go\'crn
mc:nl J>rint<:r, C:inua1a 1!•:6. bu: the 3:1'1l'�t11c� \\'Ctc not puhlished. A mpp!cmcnt:lry
mimeog1� phtd rt'port enti tk<l 'L1nd Laws a:icl Tenures' co, u ing aml·n<lmcnts up 10 l!l4S
,,·as issued in 19·t9.
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property for a t least five years and to carry out within a prescribed time
certain improvements such as clearing and fencing. These latter restraints
.
sometim es impose substantial opportunity costs on the settler.4
•

The principle of the home maintenance area is a pivotal feature of much
Australian thinking about land tenure. Various expressions of the concept
are to be found in different Acts. A typical definition would be that used i n
the New South \·Vales \Vestern Lands Act o f 1 949, viz. 'an area which when
used for the purpose for which it is reasonably fitted would be sufficient for
the maintenance i n average seasons and circumstances of the average family'.
This concept has been used as a criterion in a number of administrative
decisions affecting land.s First, it has been used to set the maximum area
which may be alienated to any one settler whether by a11ocation or as a
result of transfers from others. By the same token, i t serves to guide decisions
on applications to transfer titles. In more re.::e nt times, the concept has been
used in determining the area which may be retained by the original holder
when land is resumed or surrendered for closer settlcment. Third, i t has
been used in closer settlement programmes, particularly since "'orld Vlar II,
to set the minimum areas to be :1llotted to settlers. As such it became a
means of preventing excessiYe subdivision by over-enthusiastic State officials.
The language of the definition is extremely vague and its interpretation
must necessarily be highly subjective. In practice, the ultimate interpretation
has to be made by the local administrative units. Commonwealth government
oversight of land settlement programmes after \\Torld \Var II did encourage
greater objectivity by forcing State lands departments to resort to more
precise budgets than they had been wont to use pre\'iously. However, what
e,·er the degree of objecti\'ity introduced, the criterion clearly sets a welfare
objective i n terms of a reasonable level of living and involves no considera
tion of efficiency. The 'home maintenance area' concept has also been criti
cized for its scant regard for questions of production variability.a The

prob

lem of the survival of pastoral businesses in .areas of low and irregular rain
fall is not amenable to solution in terms of average incomes and average
seasons.
In addi tion to the various forms of freehold tenure, there are in most States
several classes of leasehold where the tenant has some right of conversion to
freehold ten,11 es. This right is hedged about with a whole host of conditions
not the least of which, usuJlly, is the pro\'ision relating to home mainten·
:mce areas

.

r

-/. e.g. I. J. :\!oncricfT and R. C. ?-lauldon, 'The EITcct of L3'1ri Clea i ng Regulations on
the Rate of F:in11 Dc\·clop111cnt, A Case S111tly', A 11Jtralia11 journal of Ag ricultural Econ
omics, \'ol 7, �o '.?, December 1963.
5. J. �. Lewis, 'Is the Concept of the !tome ;\faintenancc Arca OlHmodcd?', Australian
]oumnl of Agricu/1111u/ Eco110111ics, \'ol 7, :-:o 2, Dcc-embc. 1963, !> 9i.
6. K. 0. Campbell, 'The Ch:illcnge of I· :otluction Instability in ·\1:s1ralian Ag1iculture',
Aust1alia11 )ouma/ of Ag ricultural Eco:10111ics, \'ol 2, No l , July l�l:;S, p 9.
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LEASES FROM THE GOVERNMENT
There is a wide variety of go\'crnment leas�s in operation in the various
States. They ra!}ge from annual leases to perpetual leases, the majority of
them being for Jong periods. For most practical purposes, properties which
are held under perpetual le...ses are virtually indistinguishable from alien
ated land. Usually the consent of the responsible minister is required before
sales or transfers can be effected, but sales (and professional valuations) are
nphasized
_
made as if the pi opertics in question •.·:ci'� freehold. It should be e1
that these leases relate solely to the land and not to the improvements upon it.
I n some of the Jong-term leases, the rentals set are fixed over time. In
oth er. cases the rentals are re-appraised from time to time, e.g. at J O-year in
ten·als. Except where lanci has been made arnilable for closer settlement after
resumption, the rentals charged are usually much lower than the rentals
which ,,·ould pre\'ail on a free market. They can be as low as I · 25 per cent
of the notified capital value, which may itself be f.xed at a very conservative
level. In some cases, as in the \Vestern Division of New South "7ales, rentals
are fixed at so much per sheep carried, the actual amount payable being
based on the assessed carrying capa l i ty of the land.

As might be expected where the prc \'ailing rentals are well below the
economic level, the d ifference tends to be capit .t!izcd into the market value
of the lease in question. Under certain circumstances, go\'crnments take steps
to pre\'ent existing tenants from benefiting, at the expense of their successors,
from what are, in essence, concessional rentals.
Some of the leaseholds, particularly in Queensland and the Northern Ter
ritory, are for fixed periods, and ha\'e been criticized for their consequent
failure to encourage t h e . maintenance and impro\'eme n t of the properties in
question. The Queensland pastoral leases do however gi\'e the outgoing
lessee the right to retain a port ion of his lease cquinlent to a living area.
Some of the disabilities of the fixed lease may be offset by the incorporation
of specific proY isions in the lease. These may requi re the Jessee .to carry out,
within a defined period, a specific programme of improYemcnts such as
construction of fences, or sinking artesian bores; or they may require him

n o t to o\·erstock the land, and to "·i thhol<l stock from specific sections of the
property. Until recently, Northern TetTitory leases have e\·en sp ecified a
minimum rate of stocking . !\Iost leases make proYision for compe nsating the
lessee for a n y impro\'emcnts on the surrender or expiry of the kase, but
others such a s annual and forest least>s do not.
PRIVATE LEASING
Though leasing of rur:il lands from the gO\·ernment is ·.;idespread in Aus
tralia, lea sing from priYate indi\'id11a!� is rather rare, at least by o verseas
standards. In fact i t is so inconscque·! ! ial that agTiritltur:-tl st:itisticians d o
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not bother to collect inforination on this point. A figure of 2 per c·<'nt of

as the extent of private leasiw•
rural lands has for many years been #:J.UOted
,
0
in 1\ew South '\Talcs.
Share farming is practised to son<e extent, b u t is, by and large, con fined

to wheat and dairy industries. I t is also found to a more limited extent in the

potato and tobacco industries. In wheat areas, the landlord typically sup
plies the land and portion of the seed and fertilizer, the share farmer pio

viding the remaining inputs. Half of the product usually goes to each, thou;:;h

in some cases the landlord reserves in addition some grazing rights. There h.
ho-we\·er, great variation in the proportions of prcdu.ce retained by the ownc:r

and also i n the inputs he supplies. This applies particularly to share farm

ing arrangements in the dairy industry. In some cases the share farmer merely

proYides his labour and his situation is hardly distinguishable from th:it of
a p:iid employee.

Most of the States have attempted to afford some measure of legislati\'e

protection to agricultural ' tenants. By far the most ambitious of such le�is
Jation is the ?\cw South Wales Agricultural Hole.lings ,.\ct of 1 9·1 1 .7 Origin:illy

modelled on the comparable U n i ted Kingdom legislation, the Act contains

provisions covering (i) security of tenure (ii) payment of compensation for

disturbance (iii) payrnP.nt of compensation for unexhausted impro\'emen�
(iv) measures for securing agreement between landlord and

tenant on

certain classes of i mpro\'ements (-.') payment of compensation to the landlord

for deterioration in the Yalue of his holding resulting from the failure of
the tenant to follow the precepts of good husbandry and (vi) arbitr;i tion on

the question of fair rents. For arbitration, the Act provides for the con

stitution of ad hoc committees to which both the landlord and the tenant

nominate a representati\'e and over which an officer of the Department of

Agriculture presides. The committees may at any stage secure an opinion
on any question of law from a judge of the district court.

Despite its \\'ide-ranging pro,·isions, the Act has fallen some,,·hat short of

expectations and i t is generally acknowledged to be in need of amendment.

The chief defect of the legislation from a legal point of Yiew is that both the
provisions CO\'ering payment of compensation to tenants and those requiring

adequate notice to quit h a\'e generally pro,·ed inclfecti\'e in the case of

verbal agreements. This is because the Act conflicts with the sc\'enteenth

centuq• English Statute of Frauds which applies equally in Australian law
and which pro\'ides that any agreement not perfonned \\'ithin one year nrn\l

be in writing if i t is to be enforceable. Unfortunately verbal agreements arc

rather pre\'aknt and landlords themseh·es are disposed to arnid \\Titten con
tracts in the present circumstarices. There is also mounting agitation by land-

7. .For clctails see A. \V. S. :'.foodie and J. R. Ilntlcr, i:-r.1m Trunm:y in New Soutli Jl'clrs,
New Soirth \\'ales Dcrariment of Agricnl1u1e, Sydney l!r."1'.?.
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lords for amendment of the Act on the ground that the legislation as i t now
sta�ds makes i t excessively difficult to dismiss . i nefficient and incompetent
tenants and share farmers.
CLOSER SETTLEMENT
Perhaps the most imponant fea ture of Australian land policy in the present
century has been t11e policy of closer settlement pursued by the various State
goYernments. The emergence of this pressure for the subdivision of large
holdings cannot be full)' appreciated except against the background of earlier
Australian land policies.s

1-1 istorically the deYelopment of Australian land policy falls into several
distinct periods. Initially in the years following on the establishment of the
first settlement in New South \\'ales in 1788, free grants of land were made
to induce settlers to come to and stay in the new country. Land was also
granted to emancipated convicts on condition that a quit rent ,\·as paid after

a specified period of occupation. By the 1 830s, sy�tems of land grants by
purchase (or auction) had been introduced. "'ith their i ntroduction i t proved
im'possible to confine the so-c;'tlleJ squatters' to �he official limits of settle
ment and occupation of the hin terland proceeded apace.

r\ rapid inOux of population follo":cd the discovery of gold in I SS I . When
many erstwhile m iners began to look to fa�;�1ing as an alternative occupa tion
after goldmining had lost its attractiveness for them, they found the best
l:md

t1

lrea d y occupied by the squatters. Considerable agitation for land re

form followed and this coincided ,,·ith the establishment of self-government.
Jn the early I SGOs the new Victorian and New Souih "'ales State parliamcr. ts
passed legislJtion making ];incl

m

ore acr':'ssible to "·ou!d-be settlers and

encouraging agr i cu l l u ral activities side by side with large pastoral leases. The
:\cw South \\7aks Acts of l8GI in troduced the new principle of free selection
before survey. This legislation led to various abuses such as dummying and
within a quarter of a century further legislati ve enactments were necessary
to remedy the situation. From that time forward the whole emph:isis shifted
to closer settlement.
By

a

series of legislative en:ictments all the States developed machinery

for resuming large pastoral holdings, subcli\'iding them, and making ilie
smaller blocks a\'ailable to other settlers usually by a system of sirriple ballot·
ing. �ot :ill the closer settlement was promoted by compulsory acquisition.
Provision was made for owners ,·olunt:irily to enter into agreements for the
suhcliYision of t11eir holdings. Pastoral companies h:iving large holdings i n
favoured <listricts, particularly those comp:inics with their headquarters over
seas, haYe been p:irticul:lrly prone to resu mptio n

,<;. The

.

cb�sic ,;·01k in thi� fic!J is S. J I . Rohc11�. op. cit. For :-\cw South \\'ales dcnlop 

mmts sec C.

J.

! " in;;, ',\n 0111Ji11c of Closer S.:ulcmcnl in :-\cw Sotllh \\'aks', Rt'l'icw of

.\f1:1/;c1i11g n::d Agrhu/turnl Economics, \'ol '.?5. Nos 3·4, Scptcmucr·Dcccml>cr 19.'ii.
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The actual procedure of resumption has on occasions left much to be
desired. The chief restraint, apart from the administrative one of limited
staft. has been the a\'ailability of money to finance the purchase of the
resumed estates and to finance the new settlers. (Traditionally credit for such
settlers has been provided by the governments themselves, at concessional
rates of interest.) This means that the pace of closer settlement has varied
substantially o\·er time, depending inter ulia on the state of the economy, the
rate a t which capital has become a\'ailable, the market prospects for rural
products, the degree of success a t tending earlier settlements, and the rival
claims of other public work\ programmes. To safeguard the government
against paying higher values for estates resumed, the practice has grown up
of •proclaiming' estates destined for subdi\'ision long before resumption was
effected. This kept costs of resumption dowi:, but i t also discouraged further
priva te inYestment on the properties concerned. The inequities of this system
are apparently now being realized. In 1 966, the New South Wales govern
'
ment announced the lifting of proclamations from a long list of estates the
acquisition of which i t could not finance · for a considerable time to come.
Lands administrators have in recent decarles been loath to subdivide
properties where sheep studs are maintained. It is argued that these studs
require large flocks (and consequently large areas) to work effectively and
that the perpetuation of the studs is in the national interest.
Se\·eral attitudes and indeed myths have developed about closer settle
ment. It was long regarded as one nf tl1t chief means of developing the rural
industries, and the beneficial effects of subdivision on the adjoining country
towns \\·ere applauded. I t was said to be a way of stemming the 'drift to the
cities' and of providing opportunities for farmers' sons to remain on the land.
It has also become identified in the public mind as a fitting method of re
habilitating ex-sen-icemen. After both world wars, emphasis has been put on
the settlement of ex-sen·icemen to the exclusion of ch'ilian settlers. In fact,
in such periods, the activity becomes known as 'soldier settlement' rather
than closer settlement.
Large numbers of ex-sen·icemen were in fact assisted to acquire properties
after \Vorld \Var I. EYen before the onset of the Great Depression m:iny of
these men were in se\'ere economic difficulties. In some cases, they were in
adequately trained i n fanning. J n other c:ises the holdings on which they
were placed were too small. In still other cases, soil and :igronomic im·estiga
tions before settlement had been inadequate. Se\'eral committees of enquiry
were conducted, and a large amount of public funds was spent in reconstrnct
ing holdings and rehabilil:iting the scttlers.e
9. See Commonwealth of Austr:ilia, Report by Mr. ]11stiu Pike

011

LoJScs due to Soldier

Settlement, Go1ernme11t Printer, Ca nberra 1929; and Rural Reconstruction Commission,

Settlement and Employme11t of Returned .'1e11 on the Land,

Land Utili:ation and Farm

Settlement, Fi11a11rial a11d Ero110111ic Reconstruction of Farms (Seco11d, Third and Fourth

Reports), Gol"ernrnrnt P 1 ; nter, C:inbcrra 194.J.
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THI:: WAR SERVJCE L.\:'\D SETTLE:\1E�T SCHEr-IE

The prospect of further pressure for the settlement of ex-servicemen on

the land after "'orld \Var II led the Commonwealth government to prepare

in ad,·ancc for such an e\'entuality as part of its postwar reconstruction plans.

In 1945 a series of agreements was drawn up between the Commonwealth

go,·ernment and the States covering their respecti\'e financial obligations

for the acquisition of holdings, the development of these holdings and ad

,·anccs to sett.lers. In general, the Stat:::s of Queensland, New South "'ales
and Victoria (the principal States) bore half the cost of most i tems, the re
maining States (the agen: States) bearing a smaller proportion.to

The most important feature of the so-called War Ser.-ice Land Settlement

Scheme was the set of principles enunciated in the course of concluding the
agreements. It is fair to say that thbe set the stage for the closer settlement
acti,·ities of the past 20 years. The principles were as follows:

(i)

Settlement is to be undertaken only where economic prospects are

reasonably sound; and the number .Jf eligible persons to be settled is to be

determined by the opportunities for settlement and not by the number of
applicants;

(ii) Applicants are not to be selected as �::: t tlers unless satisfying a com

petent authority as to their eligibility, suitability and qualifications for
settlement under the scheme and their experience of farm work;

(iii) Holdings are to be of a sizP. sufficient to enable settlers to operate
efficiently and to earn a reasonable labour income;

(iv)

A suitable eligible person is not to Le precluded by reason only of

fad. of capital, b u t a settler is expected to invest in the holding a reason
able proportion of his O\\·n financial and other resources; and

(v)

Adequate guidance and technical advice is to be made available to

settlers through agricultural extension ser\'ices.n

Under this scheme, all subcli\'isions were examined by the Commonwealth

government, before any Federal finance was authorized. Special training

schemes for i n tending settlers were pro\'ided. In some States in accordance

\rith custom, the blocks a\·ailable \rere allocated by ballot among the persons

who had applied and "·ere appron:•d for inclusion in the ballot. Though the
..\ct authorizing it was dccbrcd constitutionally invalid in 1 919, the scheme
was continued. J udged on its objectives, the scheme was highly successful in

marked contrast to the failures following "'orld \Var I. Part of the success,

no doubt, must be attributed to the improvement of commodity prices which
JO. for Culler d..::Jils or the scheme sec '\\·u Service LJnd Seulerncn t-Somc Agricultural

anti

Financial

Aspcr:s 0f Joint Commom,·ealth·State Legislation', mi mco., Bureau

:\ g r ic11lt ural Econo.. 1i.:.s,

of

El;<O; :ind Yenr Book, No 37, 19·l6 ·4i, pp 1 1 3 - 1 19, Ilurcau of

Census and Statistics.
1 1 . Cornmonwcalth of Australia, :�1ar

Service

1945.
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Land

Settlemrnt

Agreement Act, No 52 of

occurred in the earl)' years.of the scheme, and which resulted in

many of the

new settlers receiving incomes well in excess of those contemplated. "'hether
or not the community at large received benefits commensurate with the cost
·

of the scheme is another question.
FARM CONSOLIDATION

Though the predom inant theme of its land policy has been closer settlement,
Australia h:is h:id some experience in the reconstruction of uneconomic hold
ings. This chiefly occurred as a result of the failure of some of the settlement
schemes of the 1920s and was associated with the wheat industry in particu
lar. The Commonwealth government assisted the States in

a

series of salvage

oper;Hions, knO\rn as marginal wheat area schemes,12 which were undertaken
mainly in the 1 0 years following tl1e Great Depression. In many cases,

a

writing-do�rn of debts and restructuring of financial obligations were all that
was im·olvecl. In other u1ses, bankrupt settlers were given

a

lump sum on

the condition that they vacated their holdings, their properties were divided

and

the resultant portions were added to those of adjoining property owners

in order to bring the reconstructed farms up to a size which was believed to

be economically viable.
A similar system of reconstruction of farms was recommended in 1960 by
�e Dairy Industry Committee of Enquiry as a means of eliminating low
income fam1s from that inclnstry, but the recommendations were not accepted

by

the government of the day.13
U�SETTLED ISSUES I N LAND POLICY

In recent years the emphasis

in

:\ustralian lands administration has shifted

primarily to problems associated with fostering the better use of the land
already

in

use:.

In

one sense this was true of the original policy of closer

settlement, but even this po!i ... y has recen tly been questioned.
THE PLACE OF CLOSER SETfLDIE::\T

Several factors haYe been responsible for this re-examination. First, the
c!evelopment of Amtralian agriculture in the past 1 5 years has led to a realirn
tion that modern agricultural technology is likely to have

a greater impact on

the rate of economic growth than :my policy of redistribution of rural hold
ings. I t has also become apparent that the market outlook for products of
intensive agricultural settlement is less favourable th:m is the outlook for
products produced under more extensive pastoral systems, products in which
Australia clearly has a comparatiYe a<l\':mtage. Third, the rising capital re12. Sec Rural Rcconslruclion Commis�ion, Finnncia/ nnd Economic Reconstruction of
Fnrms, Fourth Report, Co,·cin mcnl Prin ter, Canbcna 1944, Appendix I.
JJ. Commom.-calth of ,\u,lralia. Rej1ort of the Dairy Industry Committee of Enq11i1)·.
GO\crnrncnl P1in :cr, Canberra 1961.
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quirements o[ modem farming han
• increased the cost of go\'ernment-spon
sorc<l settlement schemes. FinJlly, pulic.y n1akers

are

coming to realize that

· in a competitive situation, there is a limit to the priority that can be given to
equity objccti\·es o\·er efficiency objectives in any land protifammc.14

Those who fa\'our the abandonment or at least the modification of tradi
tional clo�cr settlement policr point out that the important restraints to
rising pro<luctivit)' today are not land and labour, as this policy implies, b u t
capit:il a n d management.1j To cor:tinue t o attempt to p u t more people on
smaller-sized

farms is

to

fly

in the face of historical tendencies for the rural

work force to decline and the .�ize of farms to increase.
I t is argued that the social reasons ad\·anced

in favour of closer settlement

frequent ly do not bear critical examination .and that the policy is a very

crude and unsatisfactory

way of trying

to achieve a more equitable distribu

tion of rural income. Such an objecti\'e, it is claimed, could be achieved more

effective!}' through such measures as progressiYe income taxation, land taxes
and death duties. The allocation of landholdings by lottery, a procedure by
which it is possible for large gains to accrue to a few fortunate people, is also

criticized. However, financial pressures are forcing ]and settlement authori
ties increasingly to take into account the capital which the intending settler
has or to which he can get access privately, in determining the eligibility of
applicants for blocks of la"nd. This has been true of the recent Colleambally
Settlement Scheme in i\ew South '\Vale$, the Esperance Scheme in '\Vestern
Australia and the l3rigalow Scheme in Queensland.
The main economic arguments centre on the question of economies of
scale. A size of Cann <letermined on the criterion of the 'home maintenance
area' is not necessarily the most efficient size un<lcr current conditions and

it is likely to be less so with the pcissage of time. Unfortunately unequivocal

C\idence on the scale question is not available.16 However, it is evident that
family fanns considered big enough for wheat farming in the days of horse
traction arc inadequate to achie\·e realizable economics of scale under modU.

Cf. Vernon W. Ru llan, '£quily and P1oductivily ls.<ucs in :\!o<lern Agrarian Reform

ugisl:nion', paper presented lo the Conference organized by

the International Economic

�ociation on Economic Problems of AgriculLUre in Industrial Socic: ties and Repercussions
in De,·cloping Countries, Rome 1 !l65.

15. For
see

a

useful summary of the issues invoked in the reappraisal of closer settlement

D. £. Maccallum ti al., 'Closer Settle men t in the l!lGOs', journal of the Australian
Institute of Agricultural Science, Vol 28, No 3, September l!l62. For an advocacy of the:
roncinuation of closer scttlemc:nt see T. H. S trong. 'Land Tenure: in Australia in Relation
to Technical Ad\·ancc::s and Closer Settlc:ment'. journal of Farm Economics, Vol 38, No 2,

policy

May 1956.

16. Production fun ction analysis has revealed evidence of increasing rc:Lurns to scale in
the inland paslor.il a rea s and comL:int returns lo scale in the h igher rainfall areas. Sec J. H.

Duloy, 'The Al loca tion of Resources in the Wool;il owing Industry', Amira/Ian journal of
Agricultural Economics, Vol 5 , il:o 2. December l!lGl. Sec al�o J. 1'. Lc:wis, op. cit., pp 100·

101; and A. C. Lloyd, 'The Economic Si1c of Farms', journal of the Australian Institute of

Agricultural Science, \'ol 27. No 3, Septembe r 19G l .

79

cm tractor technology. The pressing nee� is to find � means of preserving

sufficient flexibility in the settlement pattern and the associated land legisla

tion so as not to inhibit the nation from reaping the fruits of continuing

tedmological advance. The establishment of a cotton industry in northern

New South \\'ales a few years ago was originally threatened by anachronistic
lcgislatiYe proYisions go\'erning the size of farms.

Jn recent years closer settlement has gradually assumed less prominence as

a n instrument of go\'ernment policy. This trend is likely to continue, if only

because of the rising cost of settlement schemes and the realization that they
tend to benefit the few rather than the many. I t may also become clearer to

governments that investment in other directions, whether within agriculture
(for example, in education and research) or elsewhere in the economy, would

be likely to contribute more to the economic growth of the nation than the

innstmcnt of an equivalent amount of government funds in closer settle
ment activities.
LEASEHOLD VERSUS ALIE�ATJON

There has been recurring argument whether additional lancl should be
alienated. Political beliefs ob,·iously colour attitudes to this question. But in
an economic context a balance has to be struck between, on the one hand,

the sayings in private capital in\'estment and the greater public control of

land use which leasing arrangements permit and, on the other hand, the
disin.:e!'!tiYe to investment and encouragement of land exploitation which

often seems to be associated with such anangements. The disadYantages of
leasehold tenure tend to be more exaggerated the shorter the lease. The

situation of landholders operating under perpetual leases, we have seen,
differs little from landholders who own their own land.

The Rural Reconstruction Commission was asked by the Commonwealth

government i n 19·13 to recommend the form of tenure which should apply i n
the settlement o f ex-sen·icemen after \\'orld \Var I I . The Commission re

ported in fa\'our of prh·ate ownership,n but ultimately the Commonwealth
go\'ernment insisted that land be made a\'ailable under leasehold tenures i n
the 'agent' States·and subsequently t h e 'principal' States with the exception
of Victoria followed suit.

Today, contro\'ersy largely re\'Ol\'es around the leases operating in the

pastoral areas of Queensland and the Northern Territory. These leases

usually run irom 25 to 10 years. They do, it should be noted, give the

go\'ernment the opport11nity to reassess property sizes periodically in the
light of technological and economic dc,·elopments. Ilowe,·er, as has been

pointed out earlier, the lessees cki i m that the limited term of the leases is not
concfuci\'e to their developing their properties. There would seem to be sub
stance in the Yiew that the achie\'cment of

a

satisfactory rate of de"elopment

17. Sec Rural RetJ11st ructi0n Commi�<ion, R111al Lnnd Te1111re and 1'11/1mtion, Ninth
Go\·ernmc11t Printer, Canberra 1916.
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of the Northern Australian bed industry will be dependent on the institu
tion of a more progressive land tenure policy.is

SOIL A!'\D RANGE CONSERVATION

Between 1938 when the New South Wales Soil Conservation Service was
established and the end of \\Torld \Var II, most of the Australian States estab
lished agencies concerned with the promotion of soil conservation.le From
the beginning, particular attention was paid to the deterioration of the
vegetation in the more arid areas and to soil erosion on the catchments of
major dams. Legislation to enable the government to require corrective
action on freehold as well as leasehoid land in such areas has gradually been
introduced, but in few cases have these powers been used. More recently, the
question of the incorporation of more stringent controls in leases to prevent
pasture deterioration has arisen. One case involved the short-term snow
leases in the Australian Alps. Another concerned the pastoral leases in Cen
tral Australia.�0 In neither case <lid it appear that the J.dministering a u thority
had sufficient knowledge of the behaviour and management of the native
vegetation to be in a position to institute rational controls over grazing. 21

\

n, LA::-:CING

DE\'ELOP�!El'\T o::-:

!'\EW A:"\D OLD LANDS

Since the turn of the century, a proportion of public investment in land
de,·elopment has gone into irrigation de\'elri!1ment. �lore lately the discovery
.
of minor elemen t deficiencies i n some areas and the development of chemical
and mechanical methods of land clearing have opened up new opportunities
for both corporate and government im·estment. Perhaps the really burning
question in Australian land policy today concerns the relative advantages o f
public inYestment i n different �orms o f Janel de,·elopment-irrigation versus
dry-land development, the opening-up of new lands in ?\orthern Australia
versus intensification of cle\'elopment in the already developed areas of the
18. }or discussion of some of the issues with respect to the I\orthem pastoral leases see
A ustra lia, Repo1·t of the Board of Inquiry into the Land and Land
Industries of the Northern Territory of Australia, Government Printer, Canberra 1937;
Commonwealth of

Queensland Go,ernment, Report of tile Royal Commission on Pastoral Lands Settlement,

Government Printer, Brisbane 1951;

Queensland

Government, Report on Progressive Land

Settlcn1cnt in Queensland by the Lr.nd Settlement Advisory Commission, GoYernmcnt
Printer, Brisbane 1959; and H. Barclay, 'Land Tenure in Relation to Agricultural and

Pastoral DeYelopmcnt', in Proceedings of the Northern Territory Scientific Liaison Con·
fere11ce, Darwin 1961.

19. For

a

reYicw of these deYelopmcnts sec K. 0. Campbell, 'The Dc\·cJopmcnt of Soi i

Consen·ation Programmes in Australia', Land Economics, Vol 24, ::-:o I, February 1918.

20. See Department of Territories, ::-:orthcrn Territory Land Board, Report 011 the Cen·
tralian Pas/01al Industry 1111dcr Drought Conditions, Darwin 1964. It is of interest to note

that this committee reported that the minimum si1e of an economic holding in Central Aus
tralia was in excess of 600 square miles.

21. K. 0. Campbell , 'Problems of Adaptation of Pastoral Businesses in the Arid Zone',

A11stralia11 journal of Agricultural Economirs, \'ol 10, No 1 , June 1966, pp 15-16.
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south an<l

so

on.�2 Details C?f some of the specific development schemes are

outlined elsewhere in this book.
Cle:1rly in a country where Lhe man-land ratio is so low, questions of land
policy will continue to exercise the public mind. But unless Australians
come to appreciate better than they do now that other resources are to a
considerable extent eficcti\'e substitutes for land and water, they will fail to
achieve the full agricultural potentiality of their country.

22. See K. 0. Campbell, 'The Rural Dcl'elopmcnt of ;>;orthcrn Australia', Australian

journal of Agricultural Eco110111irs, Yol 6, :\o I, September 1962; Il. R. Da,·idson, The

Northern Myth, '.\lelbourne University Press, '.\{elbourne 1965; B. R. Dn·idson and J . .S.
?\alson, 'Investment Opportunities in Western Australian Agriculture', Farm Policy, Vol 5,

Xo 4, March 1964; R. W. Prunster, 'Alternati\'cS in Land Dc,·clopmcnt', Farm Policy,

\'ol 4, 1'\o 3, December 196-1, and K. 0. Ca mpbell, 'An Asscs�mtnt of the C.1sc for Irriga
tion Development in Australia', in .-\mtralian Academy of Science, ll'nter Resources, Use

and Management, '.\fclbourne Uni\·crsity Prei�. '.\felbournc 1 964.
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